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Abstract
In large-scale statistical learning, data collection and model fitting are moving increasingly
toward peripheral devices—phones, watches, fitness trackers—away from centralized data collec-
tion. Concomitant with this rise in decentralized data are increasing challenges of maintaining
privacy while allowing enough information to fit accurate, useful statistical models. This mo-
tivates local notions of privacy—most significantly, local differential privacy, which provides
strong protections against sensitive data disclosures—where data is obfuscated before a statisti-
cian or learner can even observe it, providing strong protections to individuals’ data. Yet local
privacy as traditionally employed may prove too stringent for practical use, especially in modern
high-dimensional statistical and machine learning problems. Consequently, we revisit the types
of disclosures and adversaries against which we provide protections, considering adversaries with
limited prior information and ensuring that with high probability, ensuring they cannot recon-
struct an individual’s data within useful tolerances. By reconceptualizing these protections, we
allow more useful data release—large privacy parameters in local differential privacy—and we
design new (minimax) optimal locally differentially private mechanisms for statistical learning
problems for all privacy levels. We thus present practicable approaches to large-scale locally
private model training that were previously impossible, showing theoretically and empirically
that we can fit large-scale image classification and language models with little degradation in
utility.
1 Introduction
New, more powerful computational hardware and access to substantial amounts of data has made
fitting accurate models for image classification, text translation, physical particle prediction, astro-
nomical observation, and other predictive tasks possible with previously infeasible accuracy [7, 2,
49]. In many modern applications, data comes from measurements on small-scale devices with lim-
ited computation and communication ability—remote sensors, phones, fitness monitors—making
fitting large scale predictive models both computationally and statistically challenging. Moreover,
as more modes of data collection and computing move to peripherals—watches, power-metering,
internet-enabled home devices, even lightbulbs—issues of privacy become ever more salient.
Such large-scale data collection motivates substantial work. Stochastic gradient methods are
now the de facto approach to large-scale model-fitting [70, 15, 60, 29], and recent work of McMahan
et al. [54] describes systems (which they term federated learning) for aggregating multiple stochastic
model-updates from distributed mobile devices. Yet even if only updates to a model are transmitted,
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leaving all user or participant data on user-owned devices, it is easy to compromise the privacy of
users [37, 56]. To see why this issue arises, consider any generalized linear model based on a data
vector x, target y, and with loss of the form `(θ;x, y) = φ(〈θ, x〉, y). Then ∇θ`(θ;x, y) = c · x for
some c ∈ R, a scalar multiple of the user’s clear data x—a clear compromise of privacy. In this
paper, we describe an approach to fitting such large-scale models both privately and practically.
A natural approach to addressing the risk of information disclosure is to use differential pri-
vacy [35], in which one defines a mechanism M , a randomized mapping from a sample x of data
points to some space Z, which is ε-differentially private if
P(M(x) ∈ S)
P(M(x′) ∈ S) ≤ e
ε (1)
for all samples x and x′ differing in at most one entry. Because of its strength and protection
properties, differential privacy and its variants are the standard privacy definition in data analysis
and machine learning [19, 32, 22]. Nonetheless, implementing such an algorithm presumes a level
of trust between users and a centralized data analyst, which may be undesirable or even untenable,
as the data analyst has essentially unfettered access to a user’s data. Another approach to protect-
ing individual updates is to use secure multiparty computation (SMC), sometimes in conjunction
with differential privacy protections [14]. Traditional approaches to SMC require substantial com-
munication and computation, making them untenable for large-scale data collection schemes, and
Bonawitz et al. [14] address a number of these, though individual user communication and compu-
tation still increases with the number of users submitting updates and requires multiple rounds of
communication, which may be unrealistic when estimating models from peripheral devices.
An alternative to these approaches is to use locally private algorithms [67, 36, 31], in which an
individual keeps his or her data private even from the data collector. Such scenarios are natural in
distributed (or federated) learning scenarios, where individuals provide data from their devices [53,
3] but wish to maintain privacy. In our learning context, where a user has data x ∈ X that he or
she wishes to remain private, a randomized mechanism M : X → Z is ε-local differentially private
if for all x, x′ ∈ X and sets S ⊂ Z,
P(M(x) ∈ S)
P(M(x′) ∈ S) ≤ e
ε. (2)
Roughly, a mechanism satisfying inequality (2) guarantees that even if an adversary knows that
the initial data is one of x or x′, the adversary cannot distinguish them given an outcome Z (the
probability of error must be at least 1/(1 + eε)) [68]. Taking as motivation this testing definition,
the “typical” recommendation for the parameter ε is to take ε as a small constant [68, 35, 32].
Local privacy protections provide numerous benefits: they allow easier compliance with reg-
ulatory strictures, reduce risks (such as hacking) associated with maintaining private data, and
allow more transparent protection of user privacy, because unprotected private data never leaves
an individual’s device. Yet substantial work in the statistics, machine learning, and computer
science communities has shown that local differential privacy and its relaxations cause nontrivial
challenges for learning systems. Indeed, Duchi, Jordan, and Wainwright [30, 31] and Duchi and
Rogers [26] show that in a minimax (worst case population distribution) sense, learning with local
differential privacy must suffer a degradation in sample complexity that scales as d/min{ε, ε2},
where d is the dimension of the problem; taking ε as a small constant here suggests that estima-
tion in problems of even moderate dimension will be challenging. Duchi and Ruan [27] develop a
complementary approach, arguing that a worst-case analysis is too conservative and may not accu-
rately reflect the difficulty of problem instances one actually encounters, so that an instance-specific
theory of optimality is necessary. In spite of this instance-specific optimality theory for locally pri-
vate procedures—that is, fundamental limits on learning that apply to the particular problem at
2
hand—Duchi and Ruan’s results suggest that local notions of privacy as currently conceptualized
restrict some of the deployments of learning systems.
We consider an alternative conceptualization of privacy protections and the concomitant guar-
antees from differential privacy and the likelihood ratio bound (2). The testing interpretation of
differential privacy suggests that when ε 1, the definition (2) is almost vacuous. We argue that,
at least in large-scale learning scenarios, this testing interpretation is unrealistic, and allowing
mechanisms with ε  1 may provide satisfactory privacy protections, especially when there are
multiple layers of protection. Rather than providing protections against arbitrary inferences, we
wish to provide protection against accurate reconstruction of an individual’s data x. In the large
scale learning scenarios we consider, an adversary given a random observation x likely has little
prior information about x, so that protecting only against reconstructing (functions of) x under
some assumptions on the adversary’s prior knowledge allows substantially improved model-fitting.
Our formal setting is as follows. For a parameter space Θ ⊂ Rd and loss ` : Θ × X → R+, we
wish to solve the risk minimization problem
minimize
θ∈Θ
L(θ) := E[`(θ,X)]. (3)
The standard approach [40] to such problems is to construct the empirical risk minimizer θ̂n =
argminθ
1
n
∑n
i=1 `(θ,Xi) for data Xi
iid∼ P , the distribution defining the expectation (3). In this
paper, however, we consider the stochastic minimization problem (3) while providing both local
privacy to individual data Xi and—to maintain the satisfying guarantees of centralized differential
privacy (1)—stronger guarantees on the global privacy of the output θ̂n of our procedure. With
this as motivation, we describe our contributions at a high level. As above, we argue that large
local privacy (2) parameters, ε  1, still provide reasonable privacy protections. We develop
new mechanisms and privacy protecting schemes that more carefully reflect the statistical aspects
of problem (3); we demonstrate that these mechanisms are minimax optimal for all ranges of
ε ∈ [0, d], a broader range than all prior work (where d is problem dimension). A substantial
portion of this work is devoted to providing practical procedures while providing meaningful local
privacy guarantees, which currently do not exist. Consequently, we provide extensive empirical
results that demonstrate the tradeoffs between private federated (distributed) learning scenarios,
showing that it is possible to achieve performance comparable to federated learning procedures
without privacy safeguards.
1.1 Our approach and results
We propose and investigate a two-pronged approach to model fitting under local privacy. Motivated
by the difficulties associated with local differential privacy we discuss in the immediately subsequent
section, we reconsider the threat models (or types of disclosure) in locally private learning. Instead
of considering an adversary with access to all data, we consider “curious” onlookers, who wish
to decode individuals’ data but have little prior information on them. Formalizing this (as we
discuss in Section 2) allows us to consider substantially relaxed values for the privacy parameter ε,
sometimes even scaling with the dimension of the problem, while still providing protection. While
this brings us away from the standard guarantees of differential privacy, we can still provide privacy
guarantees for the type of onlookers we consider.
This privacy model is natural in distributed model-fitting (federated learning) scenarios [53, 3].
By providing protections against curious onlookers, a company can protect its users against recon-
struction of their data by, for example, internal employees; by encapsulating this more relaxed local
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privacy model within a broader central differential privacy layer, we can still provide satisfactory
privacy guarantees to users, protecting them against strong external adversaries as well.
We make several contributions to achieve these goals. In Section 2, we describe a model for
curious adversaries, with appropriate privacy guarantees, and demonstrate how (for these curious
adversaries) it is still nearly impossible to accurately reconstruct individuals’ data. We then detail
a prototypical private federated learning system in Section 3. In this direction, we develop new
(minimax optimal) privacy mechanisms for privatization of high-dimensional vectors in unit balls
(Section 4). These mechanisms yield substantial improvements over the schemes Duchi et al. [31, 30]
develop, which are optimal only in the case ε ≤ 1, providing order of magnitude improvements
over classical noise addition schemes, and we provide a unifying theorem showing the asymptotic
behavior of a stochastic-gradient-based private learning scheme in Section 4.4. As a consequence of
this result, we conclude that we have (minimax) optimal procedures for many statistical learning
problems for all privacy parameters ε ≤ d, the dimension of the problem, rather than just ε ∈
[0, 1]. We conclude our development in Section 5 with several large-scale distributed model-fitting
problems, showing how the tradeoffs we make allow for practical procedures. Our approaches allow
substantially improved model-fitting and prediction schemes; in situations where local differential
privacy with smaller privacy parameter fails to learn a model at all, we can achieve models with
performance near non-private schemes.
1.2 Why local privacy makes model fitting challenging
To motivate our approaches, we discuss why local privacy causes some difficulties in a classical
learning problem. Duchi and Ruan [27] help to elucidate the precise reasons for the difficulty
of estimation under ε-local differential privacy, and we can summarize them heuristically here,
focusing on the machine learning applications of interest. To do so, we begin with a brief detour
through classical statistical learning and the usual convergence guarantees that are (asymptotically)
possible [66].
Consider the population risk minimization problem (3), and let θ? = argminθ L(θ) denote its
minimizer. We perform a heuristic Taylor expansion to understand the difference between θ̂n and
θ?. Indeed, we have
0 =
1
n
n∑
i=1
∇`(θ̂n, Xi) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
∇`(θ?, Xi) + 1
n
n∑
i=1
(∇2`(θ?, Xi) + errori)(θ̂n − θ?)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
∇`(θ?, Xi) + (∇2L(θ?) + oP (1))(θ̂n − θ?),
(for errori an error term in the Taylor expansion of `), which—when carried out rigorously—implies
θ̂n − θ? = 1
n
n∑
i=1
−∇2L(θ?)−1∇`(θ?;Xi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:ψ(Xi)
+oP (1/
√
n). (4)
The influence function ψ [66] of the parameter θ measures the effect that changing a single obser-
vation Xi has on the resulting estimator θ̂n.
All (regular) statistically efficient estimators asymptotically have the form (4) [66, Ch. 8.9], and
typically a problem is “easy” when the variance of the function ψ(Xi) is small—thus, individual
observations do not change the estimator substantially. In the case of local differential privacy,
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however, as Duchi and Ruan [27] demonstrate, (optimal) locally private estimators typically have
the form
θ̂n − θ? = 1
n
n∑
i=1
[ψ(Xi) +Wi] (5)
where Wi is a noise term that must be taken so that ψ(x) and ψ(x
′) are indistinguishable for all
x, x′. Essentially, a local differentially private procedure cannot leave ψ(x) small even when it is
typically small (i.e. the problem is easy) because it could be large for some value x. In locally private
procedures, this means that differentially private tools for typically “insensitive” quantities (cf. [32])
cannot apply, as an individual term ψ(Xi) in the sum (5) is (obviously) sensitive to arbitrary changes
in Xi. An alternative perspective comes via information-theoretic ideas [26]: differential privacy
constraints are essentially equivalent to limiting the bits of information it is possible to communicate
about individual data Xi, where privacy level ε corresponds to a communication limit of ε bits,
so that we expect to lose in efficiency over non-private or non-communication-limited estimators
at a rate roughly of d/ε (see Duchi and Rogers [26] for a formalism). The consequences of this
are striking, and extend even to weakenings of local differential privacy [26, 27]: adaptivity to
easy problems is essentially impossible for standard ε-locally-differentially private procedures, at
least when ε is small, and there must be substantial dimension-dependent penalties in the error
θ̂n− θ?. Thus, to enable high-quality estimates for quantities of interest in machine learning tasks,
we explore locally differentially private settings with larger privacy parameter ε.
2 Privacy protections
In developing any statistical machine learning system providing privacy protections, it is important
to consider the types of attacks that we wish to protect against. In distributed model fitting and
federated learning scenarios, we consider two potential attackers: the first is a curious onlooker
who can observe all updates to a model and communication from individual devices, and the
second is from a powerful external adversary who can observe the final (shared) model or other
information about individuals who may participate in data collection and model-fitting. For the
latter adversary, essentially the only effective protection is to use a small privacy parameter in
a localized or centralized differentially private scheme [54, 35, 59]. For the curious onlookers,
however—for example, internal employees of a company fitting large-scale models—we argue that
protecting against reconstruction is reasonable.
2.1 Differential privacy and its relaxations
We begin by discussing the various definitions of privacy we consider, covering both centralized and
local definitions of privacy. We begin with the standard centralized definitions, which extend the
basic differential privacy definition (1), and allow a trusted curator to view the entire dataset. We
have
Definition 2.1 (Differential privacy, Dwork et al. [35, 34]). A randomized mechanism M : X n → Z
is (ε, δ) differentially private if for all samples x,x′ ∈ X n differing in at most a single example, for
all measurable sets S ⊂ Z
P(M(x) ∈ S) ≤ eεP(M(x′) ∈ S) + δ.
Other variants of privacy require that likelihood ratios are near one on average, and include
concentrated and Re´nyi differential privacy [33, 18, 59]. Recall that the Re´nyi α-divergence between
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distributions P and Q is
Dα (P ||Q) := 1
α− 1 log
∫ (
dP
dQ
)α
dQ,
where Dα (P ||Q) = Dkl (P ||Q) when α = 1 by taking a limit. We abuse notation, and for random
variables X and Y distributed as P and Q, respectively, write Dα (X||Y ) := Dα (P ||Q), which allows
us to make the following
Definition 2.2 (Re´nyi-differential privacy [59]). A randomized mechanism M : X n → Z is (ε, α)-
Re´nyi differentially private if for all samples x,x′ ∈ X n differing in at most a single example,
Dα
(
M(x)||M(x′)) ≤ ε.
Mironov [59] shows that if M is ε-differentially private, then for any α ≥ 1, it is (min{ε, 2αε2}, α)-
Re´nyi private, and conversely, if M is (ε, α)-Re´nyi private, it also satisfies (ε+ log(1/δ)α−1 , δ)-differential
privacy for all δ ∈ [0, 1].
We often use local notions of these definitions, as we consider protections for individual data
providers without trusted curation; in this case, the mechanism M applied to an individual data
point x is locally private if the Definition 2.1 or 2.2 holds with M(x) and M(x′) replaced by M(x)
and M(x′), where x, x′ ∈ X are arbitrary.
2.2 Reconstruction breaches
Abstractly, we work in a setting in which a user or study participant has data X he or she wishes
to keep private. Via some process, this data is transformed into a vector W—which may simply be
an identity transformation, but W may also be a gradient of the loss ` on the datum X or other
derived statistic. We then privatize W via a randomized mapping W → Z. An onlooker wishes to
estimate some function f(X) on the private data X. In most scenarios with a curious onlooker,
if X or f(X) is suitably high-dimensional, the onlooker has limited prior information about X, so
that relatively little obfuscation is required in the mapping from W → Z.
As a motivating example, consider an image processing scenario. A user has an image X, where
W ∈ Rd are wavelet coefficients of X (in some prespecified wavelet basis) [52]; without loss of
generality, we assume we normalize W to have energy ‖W‖2 = 1. Let f(X) be a low-dimensional
version of X (say, based on the first 1/8 of wavelet coefficients); then (at least intuitively) taking
Z to be a noisy version of W such that ‖Z −W‖2 & 1—that is, noise on the scale of the energy
‖W‖2—should be sufficient to guarantee that the observer is unlikely to be able to reconstruct
f(X) to any reasonable accuracy. Moreover, a simple modification of the techniques of Hardt and
Talwar [39] shows that for W ∼ Uni(Sd−1), any ε-differentially private quantity Z for W satisfies
E[‖Z −W‖2] & 1 whenever ε ≤ d − log 2. That is, we might expect that in the definition (2) of
local differential privacy, even very large ε provide protections against reconstruction.
With this in mind, let us formalize a reconstruction breach in our scenario. Here, the onlooker
(or adversary) has a prior pi on X ∈ X , and there is a known (but randomized) mechanism
M :W → Z, W 7→ Z = M(W ). We then have the following definition.
Definition 2.3 (Reconstruction breach). Let pi be a prior on X , and let X,W,Z be generated with
Markov structure X → W → Z = M(W ) for a mechanism M . Let f : X → Rk be the target of
reconstruction and Lrec : Rk×Rk → R+ be a loss function. Then an estimator v̂ : Z → Rk provides
an (α, p, f)-reconstruction breach for the loss Lrec if there exists z such that
P (Lrec(f(X), v̂(z)) ≤ α |M(W ) = z) > p. (6)
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If for every estimator v̂ : Z → Rk,
sup
z∈Z
P (Lrec(f(X), v̂(z)) ≤ α |M(W ) = z) ≤ p,
then the mechanism M is (α, p, f)-protected against reconstruction for the loss Lrec.
Key to Definition 2.3 is that it applies uniformly across all possible observations z of the mecha-
nism M—there are no rare breaches of privacy.1 This requires somewhat stringent conditions on
mechanisms and also disallows relaxed privacy definitions beyond differential privacy.
2.3 Protecting against reconstruction
We can now develop guarantees against reconstruction. The simple insight is that if an adversary
has a diffuse prior on the data of interest f(X)—is a priori unlikely to be able to accurately
reconstruct f(X) given no information—the adversary remains unlikely to be able to reconstruct
f(X) given differentially private views of X even for very large ε. Key to this is the question of how
“diffuse” we might expect an adversary’s prior to be. We detail a few examples here, providing what
we call best-practices recommendations for limiting information, and giving some strong heuristic
calculations for reasonable prior information.
We begin with the simple claim that prior beliefs change little under differential privacy, which
follows immediately from Bayes’ rule.
Lemma 2.1. Let the mechanism M be ε-differentially private and let V = f(X) for a measurable
function f . Then for any pi ∈ P on X and measurable sets A,A′ ⊂ f(X ), the posterior distribution
piV (· | z) (for z = M(X)) satisfies
piV (A | z, z)
piV (A′ | z, z) ≤ e
ε piV (A)
piV (A′)
.
Based on Lemma 2.1, we can show the following result, which guarantees that difficulty of
reconstruction of a signal is preserved under private mappings.
Lemma 2.2. Assume that the prior pi0 on X is such that for a tolerance α, probability p(α), target
function f , and loss Lrec, we have
Ppi0(Lrec(f(X), v0) ≤ α) ≤ p(α) for all fixed v0.
If M is ε-differentially private, then it is (α, eε · p(α), f)-protected against reconstruction for Lrec.
Proof Lemma 2.1 immediately implies that for any estimator v̂ based on Z = M(X), we have
for any realized z and V = f(X)
P(Lrec(V, v̂(z)) ≤ α | Z = z) =
∫
1 {Lrec(v, v̂(z)) ≤ α} dpiV (v | z)
≤ eε
∫
1 {Lrec(v, v̂(z)) ≤ α} dpiV (v).
The final quantity is eεP(Lrec(f(X), v0) ≤ α) ≤ eεp(α) for v0 = v̂(z), as desired.
Let us make these ideas a bit more concrete through two examples: one when it is reasonable
to assume a diffuse prior, one for much more peaked priors.
1We ignore measurability issues; in our setting, all random variables are mutually absolutely continuous and follow
regular conditional probability distributions, so the conditioning on z in Def. 2.3 has no issues [42].
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2.3.1 Diffuse priors and reconstruction of linear functions
For a prior pi on X and f : X → C ⊂ Rk, where C is a compact subset of Rk, let pif be the
push-forward (induced prior) on f(X) and let pi0 be some base measure on C (typically, this will
be a uniform measure). Then for ρ0 ∈ [0,∞] define the set of plausible priors
Pf (ρ0) :=
{
pi on X s.t. log
dpif (v)
dpi0(v)
≤ ρ0, for v ∈ C
}
. (7)
For example, consider an image processing situation, where we wish to protect against reconstruc-
tion even of low-frequency information, as this captures the basic content of an image. In this case,
we consider an orthonormal matrix A ∈ Ck×d, AA∗ = Ik, and an adversary wishing to reconstruct
the normalized projection
fA(x) =
Ax
‖Ax‖2
=
Au
‖Au‖2
for u = x/ ‖x‖2 . (8)
For example, A may be the first k rows of the Fourier transform matrix, or the first level of a wavelet
hierarchy, so the adversary seeks low-frequency information about x. In either case, the “low-
frequency” Ax is enough to give a sense of the private data, and protecting against reconstruction
is more challenging for small k.
In the particular orthogonal reconstruction case, we take the initial prior pi0 to be uniform on
Sk−1—a reasonable choice when considering low frequency information as above—and consider `2
reconstruction with Lrec(u, v) = ‖u/ ‖u‖2 − v/ ‖v‖2‖2 (when v 6= 0, otherwise setting Lrec(u, v) =√
2). For V uniform and v0 ∈ Sk−1, we have E[‖V − v0‖22] = 2, so that thresholds of the form
α =
√
2− 2a with a small are the most natural to consider in the reconstruction (6). We have the
following proposition on reconstruction after a locally differentially private release.
Proposition 1. Let M be ε-locally differentially private (2) and k ≥ 4. Let f = fA as in Eq. (8)
and pi ∈ Pf (ρ0) as in Eq. (7). Then for a ∈ [0, 1], M is (
√
2− 2a, p(a), fA)-protected against
reconstruction for
p(a) =
{
exp
(
ε+ ρ0 +
k
2 · log(1− a2)
)
if a ∈ [0, 1/√2]
exp
(
ε+ ρ0 +
k−1
2 · log(1− a2)− log(2a
√
k)
)
if a ∈ [√2/k, 1].
Simplifying this slightly and rewriting, assuming the reconstruction v̂ takes values in Sk−1, we have
P(‖f(X)− v̂(Z)‖2 ≤
√
2− 2a | Z = z) ≤ exp
(
−ka
2
2
)
exp(ε+ ρ0)
for f(x) = Ax/ ‖Ax‖ and a ≤ 1/√2. That is, unless ε or ρ0 are of the order of k, the probability
of obtaining reconstructions better than (nearly) random guessing is extremely low.
Proof Let Y ∼ Uni (Sk−1) and v0 ∈ Sk−1. We then have
‖Y − v0‖22 = 2 · (1− 〈Y, v0〉) .
We collect a number of standard facts on the uniform distribution on Sk−1 in Appendix D, which
we reference frequently. Lemma D.1 implies that for all v0 ∈ Sk−1 and a ∈ [0, 1/
√
2] that
Ppiuni(‖Y − v0‖2 <
√
2− 2a) = P (〈Y, v0〉 > a) ≤ (1− a2)k/2
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Because V = fA(X) has prior piV such that dpiV /dpiuni ≤ eρ0 , we obtain
PpiV
(‖V − v0‖2 < √2− 2a) ≤ eρ0 · (1− a2)k/2 .
Then Lemma 2.2 gives the first result of the proposition.
When the desired accuracy is higher (i.e. a ∈ [√2/k, 1]), Lemma D.1 with our assumed ratio
bound between piV and piuni implies
PpiV (‖V − v0‖2 ≤
√
2− 2a) ≤ eρ0Ppiuni(‖Y − v0‖2 <
√
2− 2a) ≤ eρ0 (1− a
2)
k−1
2
2a
√
k
.
Applying Lemma 2.2 completes the proof.
2.3.2 Reconstruction protections against sparse data
When it is unreasonable to assume that an individual’s data is near uniform on a d-dimensional
space, additional strategies are necessary to limit prior information. We now view an individual
data provider as having multiple “items” that an adversary wishes to investigate. For example,
in the setting of fitting a word model on mobile devices—to predict next words in text messages
to use as suggestions when typing, for example—the items might consist of all pairs and triples of
words the individual has typed. In this context, we combine two approaches:
(i) An individual contributes data only if he/she has sufficiently many data points locally (for
example, in our word prediction example, has sent sufficiently many messages)
(ii) An individual’s data must be diverse or sufficiently stratified (in the word prediction example,
the individual sends many distinct messages).
As Lemma 2.2 makes clear, if M is ε-differentially private and for any fixed v ∈ Z we have
P(Lrec(v, f(X)) ≤ a) ≤ p0, then for all functions f̂ ,
P(Lrec(f̂(M(X)), f(X)) ≤ a) ≤ eεp0. (9)
We consider an example of sampling a histogram—specifically thinking of sampling messages or
related discrete data. We call the elements words in a dictionary of size d, indexed by j = 1, . . . , d.
To stratify the data (approach (ii)), we treat a user’s data as a vector x ∈ X ∈ {0, 1}d, where
xj = 0 if the user has not used word j, otherwise xj = 1. We do not allow a user to participate
until xT1 ≥ m for a particular “mini batch” size m (approach (i)). Now, let us discuss the prior
probability of reconstructing a user’s vector x. We consider reconstruction via precision and recall.
Let v ∈ {0, 1}d denote a vector of predictions of the used words, where vj = 1 if we predict word j
is used. Then we define
precision(x, v) :=
vTx
vT1
and recall(x, v) :=
vTx
1Tx
,
that is, precision measures the fraction of predicted words that are correct, and recall the fraction
of used words the adversary predicts correctly. We say that the signal x has been reconstructed for
some p, r if precision(x, v) ≥ p and recall(x, v) ≥ r. Let us bound the probability of each of these
events under appropriate priors on the vector X ∈ {0, 1}d.
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Using Zipfian models of text and discretely sampled data [21], a reasonable a priori model of
the sequence X, when we assume that a user must draw at least m elements, is that independently
P(Xj = 1) = min
{
m
j
, 1
}
. (10)
With this model for a prior, we may bound the probability of achieving good precision or recall:
Lemma 2.3. Let γ ≥ 2 and assume the vector X satisfies the Zipfian model (10). Assume that
the vector v ∈ {0, 1}d satisfies vT1 ≥ γm. Then
P(precision(v,X) ≥ p) ≤ exp
(
−min
{
(pγ − 1− log γ)2+m
2 log γ
,
3
4
(pγ − 1− log γ)+m
})
.
Conversely, assume that the vector v ∈ {0, 1}d satisfies vT1 ≥ γm, and define τ(r, d,m, γ) :=
r(1 + log dm+1)− 1− log γ. Then
P(recall(v,X) ≥ r) ≤ exp
(
−min
{
(τ(r, d,m, γ))2+m
4(1− r2) log dm
,
3
4
(τ(r, d,m, γ))+m
})
.
See Appendix A.1 for a proof.
Considering Lemma 2.3, we can make a few simplifications to see the (rough) beginning re-
construction guarantees we consider—with explicit calculations on a per-application basis. In
particular, we see that for any fixed precision value p and recall value r, we may take γ = 2p log
1
p
to obtain that as long as r log dm ≥ 2 log 1p , then
P (precision(v,X) ≥ p and recall(v,X) ≥ r) ≤ max
{
exp
(
−cm log 1
p
)
, exp
(
−cm log d
m
)}
=: pr,d,m.
for a numerical constant c > 0. Thus, we have the following protection guarantee.
Proposition 2. Let the conditions of Lemma 2.3 hold. Define the reconstruction loss Lrec(v,X)
to be 1 if precision(v,X) ≥ p and recall(v, x) ≥ r, 0 otherwise, where r log dm ≥ 2 log 1p . Then if M
is ε-locally differentially private, M is (0, eεpr,d,m)-protected against reconstruction.
Consequently, we make the following recommendation: in the case that signals are dictionary-
like, a best practice is to aggregate together at least m = dρ such signals, for some power ρ, and
use (local) privacy budget ε in differentially private mechanisms of at most ε = cm, where c is a
small (near 0) constant. We revisit this in the language modeling applications in the experiments.
3 Applications in federated learning
Our overall goal is to implement federated learning, where distributed units send private updates
to a shared model to a centralized location. Recalling our population risk (3), basic distributed
learning procedures (without privacy) iterate as follows [13, 24, 17]:
1. A centralized parameter θ is distributed among a batch of b workers, each with a local sample
Xi, i = 1, . . . , b.
2. Each worker computes an update ∆i := θi − θ to the model parameters.
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3. The centralized procedure aggregates {∆i}bi=1 into a global update ∆ and updates θ ← θ + ∆.
In the prototypical stochastic gradient method, ∆i = −η∇`(θ,Xi) for some stepsize η > 0 in step 2,
and ∆ = 1b
∑b
i=1 ∆i is the average of the stochastic gradients at each sample Xi in step 3.
In our private distributed learning context, we elaborate steps 2 and 3 so that each provides
privacy protections: in the local update step 2, we use locally private mechanisms to protect indi-
viduals’ private data Xi—satisfying Definition 2.3 on protection against reconstruction breaches.
Then in the central aggregation step 3, we apply centralized differential privacy mechanisms to
guarantee that any model θ communicated to users in the broadcast 1 is globally private. The
overall feedback loop provides meaningful privacy guarantees, as a user’s data is never transmitted
clearly to the centralized server, and strong centralized privacy guarantees mean that the final and
intermediate parameters θ provide no sensitive disclosures.
3.1 A private distributed learning system
Let us more explicitly describe the implementation of a distributed learning system. The outline
of our system is similar to the development of Duchi et al. [30, 31, Sec. 5.2] and the system that
McMahan et al. [55] outline; we differ in that we allow more general updates and privatize individual
users’ data before communication, as the centralized data aggregator may not be completely trusted.
The stochastic optimization proceeds as follows. The central aggregator maintains the global
model parameter θ ∈ Rd, and in each iteration, chooses a random subset (mini-batch) B of expected
size qN , where q ∈ (0, 1) is the subsampling rate and N the total population size available. Each
individual i ∈ B sampled then computes a local update, which we describe abstractly by a method
Update that takes as input the local sample xi = {xi,1, . . . , xi,m} and central parameter θ, then
θi ← Update (xi, θ) .
Many updates are possible. Perhaps the most popular rule is to apply a gradient update, where
from an initial model θ0 and for stepsize η we apply
Update(xi, θ0) := θ0− η 1
m
m∑
j=1
∇`(θ0, xi,j) = argmin
θ
 1m
m∑
j=1
〈∇`(θ0, xi,j), θ − θ0〉+ 1
2η
‖θ − θ0‖22
 .
An alternative is to stochastic proximal-point-type updates [6, 46, 43, 12, 23], which update
Update(xi, θ0) := argmin
θ
 1m
m∑
j=1
`(θ, xi,j) +
1
2ηi
‖θ − θ0‖22
 , (11)
or their relaxations to use approximate models [6, 5].
After computing the local update θi, we privatize the scaled local difference ∆i :=
1
η (θi − θ0),
which is the (stochastic) gradient mapping for typical model-based updates [6, 5], as this scaling
by stepsize enforces a consistent expected update magnitude. We let
∆̂i = M(∆i) (12)
where M is a private mechanism, be an unbiased (private) view of ∆i, detailing mechanisms M
in Section 4. Given the privatized local updates {∆̂i}i∈B, we project the update of each onto an
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`2-ball of fixed radius ρ, so that for projρ(v) := min{ρ/ ‖v‖2 , 1}·v we consider the averaged gradient
mapping
∆̂← η
qN
(∑
i∈B
projρ(∆̂i) + Z
)
and θ(t+1) = θ(t) + ∆̂. (13)
The projection operation projρ limits the contribution of any individual update, while the vector
Z ∼ N(0, σ2) is Gaussian and provides a centralized privacy guarantee, where we describe σ2
presently. In the case that the loss functions ` are Lipschitz—typically the case in statistical learning
scenarios with classification, for example, logistic regression—the projection is unnecessary as long
as the data vectors xi lie in a compact space.
It remains to discuss the global privacy guarantees we provide via the noise addition Z. For
any individual i, we have 1qN ‖projρ(∆̂i)‖2 ≤ ρ/(qN); thus we may use Abadi et al.’s “moments
accountant” analysis [1], which reposes on Re´nyi-differential privacy (Def. 2.2). We first present
an intuitive explanation; the precise parameter settings we explain in the experiments, which make
the privacy guarantees as sharp as possible using computational evaluations of the privacy param-
eters [1]. First, if Q denotes the distribution (13) of ∆̂ and Q0 denotes its distribution when we
remove a fixed user i0, then the Re´nyi-2-divergence between the two [1, Lemma 3] satisfies
D2 (Q||Q0) ≤ log
[
1 +
q2
1− q
(
exp
(‖∆̂i0‖22
σ2
− 1
))]
≤ q
2
1− q
(
eρ
2/σ2 − 1
)
,
and the Re´nyi-α-divergence is Dα (Q||Q0) ≤ α(α−1)q
2
1−q (e
ρ2/σ2 − 1) + O(q3α3/σ3) for α ≤ σ2 log 1qσ .
Thus, letting εα,tot denote the cumulative Re´nyi-α privacy loss after T iterations of the update (13),
we have
εα,tot ≤ T q
2
1− q
[
exp
(
ρ2
σ2
)
− 1
]
+O
(
q3α3
σ3
)
.
This remains below a fixed ε for
σ2 ≥ ρ
2
log(1 + ε(1−q)
Tq2
)
(1 + o(1)) ≈ Tq
2ρ2
ε
,
where o(1)→ 0 as qα→ 0, and thus for any choice of q = m/N—using batches of size m—as long
as we have roughly σ2 ≥ Tm2ρ2
N2εα
, we guarantee centralized (εα, α)-Re´nyi-privacy.
3.2 Asymptotic Analysis
To provide a fuller story and demonstrate the general consequences of our development, we now
turn to an asymptotic analysis of our distributed statistical learning scheme for solving problem (3)
under locally private updates (12). We ignore the central privatization term, that is, addition of
Z in update (13), as it is asymptotically negligible in our setting. To set the stage, we consider
minimizing the population risk L(θ) := E[`(θ,X)] using an i.i.d. sample X1, . . . , XN
iid∼ P for some
population P .
The simplest strategy in this case is to use the stochastic gradient method, which (using a
stepsize sequence ηt) performs updates
θ(t+1) ← θ(t) − ηtgt
where for Xt
iid∼ P and defining the σ-field Ft := σ(X1, . . . , Xt) we have θ(t) ∈ Ft−1 and
E[gt | Ft−1] = ∇`(θ(t);Xt).
12
In this case, under the assumptions that L is C2 in a neighborhood of θ? = argminθ L(θ) with
∇2L(θ?)  0 and that for some C <∞, we have
E[‖gt‖2 | Ft−1] ≤ C
(
1 + ‖θ(t) − θ?‖2
)
and E[gtg>t | Ft−1] a.s.→ Σ
Polyak and Juditsky [61] provide the following result.
Corollary 3.1 (Theorem 2 [61]). Let θ¯(T ) = 1T
∑T
t=1 θ
(t). Assume the stepsizes ηt ∝ t−β for some
β ∈ (1/2, 1). Then under the preceding conditions,
√
T
(
θ¯(T ) − θ?
)
d→N (0,∇2L(θ?)−1Σ∇2L(θ?)−1) .
We now consider the impact that local privacy has on this result. Let M be a local privatizing
mechanism (12), and define Z(θ;x) = M(∇`(θ;x)). We assume that each application of the
mechanismM is (conditional on the pair (θ, x)) independent of all others. In this case, the stochastic
gradient update becomes
θ(t+1) ← θ(t) − ηt · Z(θ(t);Xt).
In all of our privatization schemes to come, we have continuity of the privatization Z in θ so that
limθ→θ? E[Z(θ;X)Z(θ;X)>] = E[Z(θ?;X)Z(θ?;X)>]. Additionally, we have the unbiasedness—as
we show—that conditional on θ and x, E[Z(θ;x)] = ∇`(θ;x). When we make the additional assump-
tion that the gradients of the loss are bounded—which holds, for example, for logistic regression as
long as the data vectors are bounded—we have the following a consequence of Corollary 3.1.
Corollary 3.2. Let the conditions of Corollary 3.1 and the preceding paragraph hold. Assume that
supθ∈Θ supx∈X ‖∇`(θ;x)‖2 ≤ rmax <∞. Let Σpriv := E[Z(θ?;X)Z(θ?;X)>]. Then
√
T
(
θ¯(T ) − θ?
)
d→N (0,∇2L(θ?)−1Σpriv∇2L(θ?)−1) .
Key to Corollary 3.2 is that—as we describe in the next section—we can design mechanisms
for which
Σpriv  Σ? + C
[
d
ε ∧ ε2 Σ? +
tr(Σ?)
(ε ∧ ε2)I
]
for a numerical constant C < ∞, where Σ? = Cov(∇`(θ?;X)). This is (in a sense) the “correct”
scaling of the problem with dimension and local privacy level ε, is minimax optimal [26], and is in
contrast to previous work in local privacy [31]. Describing this more precisely requires description
of our privacy mechanisms and alternatives, to which we now turn.
4 Separated Private Mechanisms for High Dimensional Vectors
The main application of the privacy mechanisms we develop is to minimax rate-optimal private
(distributed) statistical learning scenarios; accordingly, we now carefully consider mechanisms to use
in the private updates (12). Motivated by the difficulties we outline in Section 1.2 for locally private
model fitting—in particular, that estimating the magnitude of a gradient or influence function is
challenging, and the scale of an update is essentially important—we consider mechanisms that
transmit information W ∈ Rd by privatizing a pair (U,R), where U = W/ ‖W‖2 is the direction
and R = ‖W‖2 the magnitude, letting Z1 = M1(U) and Z2 = M2(R) be their privatized versions
(see Fig. 1). We consider mechanisms satisfying the following definition.
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X W
U
R
Z1
Z2
Figure 1: Markovian graphical structure between data X and privatized pair (Z1, Z2)
{
u
v
w.p. p
w.p. 1− p
γ
Figure 2. Private sampling scheme
for the `2 ball, PrivUnit2 in Alg. 1.
Input unit vector u is resampled, cho-
sen uniformly from the shaded spheri-
cal cap—parameterized by the distance
γ ∈ [0, 1] from the equator—with proba-
bility p and uniformly from the comple-
ment with probability 1− p.
Definition 4.1 (Separated Differential Privacy). A pair of mechanisms M1,M2 mapping from
U × R to Z1 × Z2 (i.e. a channel with the Markovian structure of Fig. 1) is (ε1, ε2)-separated
differentially private if Mi is εi-locally differentially private (2) for i = 1, 2.
The basic composition properties of differentially private channels [32] guarantee thatM = (M1,M2)
is (ε1 + ε2)-locally differentially private, so such mechanisms enjoy the benefits of differentially pri-
vate algorithms—group privacy, closure under post-processing, and composition protections [32]—
and they satisfy the reconstruction guarantees we detail in Section 2.3.
The key to efficiency in all of our applications is to have accurate estimates of the actual update
∆ ∈ Rd—frequently simply the stochastic gradient ∇`(θ;x). We consider two regimes of the most
interest: Euclidean settings [61, 60] (where we wish to privatize vectors belonging to `2 balls)
and the common non-Euclidean scenarios arising in high-dimensional estimation and optimization
(mirror descent [60, 11]), where we wish to privatize vectors belonging to `∞ balls. We thus describe
mechanisms for releasing unit vectors, after which we show how to release scalar magnitudes; the
combination allows us to release (optimally accurate) unbiased vector estimates, which we can
employ in distributed and online statistical learning problems. We conclude the section by revisiting
the asymptotic normality results of Corollary 3.2, which unifies our entire development, providing
a minimax optimal convergence guarantee—for all privacy regimes ε—better than those available
for previous locally differentially private learning procedures.
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Algorithm 1 Privatized Unit Vector: PrivUnit2
Require: u ∈ Sd−1, γ ∈ [0, 1], p ≥ 12 .
Draw random vector V according to the distribution
V =
{
uniform on {v ∈ Sd−1 | 〈v, u〉 ≥ γ} with probability p
uniform on {v ∈ Sd−1 | 〈v, u〉 < γ} otherwise. (14)
Set α = d−12 , τ =
1+γ
2 , and
m =
(1− γ2)α
2d−2(d− 1)
[
p
B(α, α)−B(τ ;α, α) −
1− p
B(τ ;α, α)
]
(15)
return Z = 1m · V
4.1 Privatizing unit `2 vectors with high accuracy
We begin with the Euclidean case, which arises in most classical applications of stochastic gradient-
like methods [71, 61, 60]. In this case, we have a vector u ∈ Sd−1 (i.e. ‖u‖2 = 1), and we wish to
generate an ε-differentially private vector Z with the property that
E[Z | u] = u for all u ∈ Sd−1,
where the size ‖Z‖2 is as small as possible to maximize the efficiency in Corollary 3.2.
We modify the sampling strategy of Duchi et al. [31] to develop an optimal mechanism. Given
a vector v ∈ Sd−1, we draw a vector V from a spherical cap {v ∈ Sd−1 | 〈v, u〉 ≥ γ} with some
probability p ≥ 12 or from its complement {v ∈ Sd−1 | 〈v, u〉 < γ} with probability 1 − p, where
γ ∈ [0, 1] and p are constants we shift to trade accuracy and privacy more precisely. In Figure 2,
we give a visual representation of this mechanism, which we term PrivUnit2 (see Algorithm 1);
in the next subsection we demonstrate the choices of γ and scaling factors to make the scheme
differentially private and unbiased. Given its inputs u, γ, and p, Algorithm 1 returns Z satisfying
E[Z | u] = u. We set the quantity m in Eq. (15) to guarantee this normalization, where
B(x;α, β) :=
∫ x
0
tα−1(1− t)β−1dt where B(α, β) := B(1;α, β) = Γ(α)Γ(β)
Γ(α+ β)
denotes the incomplete beta function. It is possible to sample from this distribution using in-
verse CDF transformations and continued fraction approximations to the log incomplete beta func-
tion [62].
In the remainder of this subsection, we describe the privacy preservation, bias, and variance
properties of Algorithm 1.
4.1.1 Privacy analysis
Most importantly, Algorithm 1 protects privacy for appropriate choices of the spherical cap level
γ. Indeed, the next result shows that γε ≈
√
ε/d is sufficient to guarantee ε-differential privacy.
Theorem 1. Let γ ∈ [0, 1] and p0 = eε01+eε0 . Then algorithm PrivUnit2(·, γ, p0) is (ε + ε0)-
differentially private whenever γ ≥ 0 is such that
ε ≥ log 1 + γ ·
√
2(d− 1)/pi(
1− γ ·√2(d− 1)/pi)
+
, i.e. γ ≤ e
ε − 1
eε + 1
√
pi
2(d− 1) , (16a)
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or
ε ≥ 1
2
log(d) + log 6− d− 1
2
log(1− γ2) + log γ and γ ≥
√
2
d
. (16b)
Proof We again leverage the results in Appendix D. The random vector V ∈ Sd−1 in Alg. 1 has
density (conditional on u ∈ Sd−1)
p(v | u) ∝
{
p0/P(〈U, u〉 ≥ γ) if 〈v, u〉 ≥ γ
(1− p0)/P(〈U, u〉 < γ) if 〈v, u〉 < γ.
We use that γ 7→ P(〈U, u〉 < γ) is increasing in γ to obtain (by definition of p0) that
p(v | u)
p(v | u′) ≤ e
ε0 · P(〈U, u
′〉 < γ)
P(〈U, u〉 ≥ γ) , all u, u
′ ∈ Sd−1. (17)
It is thus sufficient to prove that the last fraction has upper bound eε.
We consider two cases in inequality (17). In the first, suppose that γ ≥√2/d. Then Lemma D.1
implies
P(〈U, u′〉 < γ)
P(〈U, u〉 ≥ γ) ≤
6γ
√
d
(1− γ2) d−12
,
which is bounded by eε when log 6 + 12 log d + log γ − d−12 log(1 − γ2) ≤ ε. In the second case,
Lemma D.3 implies
P(〈U, u′〉 < γ)
P(〈U, u〉 ≥ γ) ≤
1 + γ
√
2(d− 1)/pi
1− γ√2(d− 1)/pi ,
which is bounded by eε if and only if γ ≤ eε−1eε+1
√
pi/(2(d− 1)).
4.1.2 Bias and variance
We now turn to optimality and error properties of Algorithm 1. Our first result is an lower bound
on the `2-accuracy of any private mechanism, which follows from the paper of Duchi and Rogers
[26].
Proposition 3. Assume that the mechanism M : Sd−1 → Rd is any of ε-differentially private,
(ε, δ)-differentially private with δ ≤ 12 , or (ε∧ ε2, α)-Re´nyi differentially private for input x ∈ Sd−1,
all with ε ≤ d. Then for X uniformly distributed in {±1/√d}d,
E[‖M(X)−X‖22] ≥ c ·
d
ε ∧ ε2 ∧ 1,
where c > 0 is a numerical constant. Moreover, if M is unbiased, then E[‖M(X)−X‖22] ≥ c dε∧ε2 .
Proof The first result is immediate by the result [26, Corollary 3]. For the unbiasedness lower
bound, note that if for a constant c0 < c we have E[‖M(X)−X‖22] ≤ c0 dε∧ε2 , then given a
sample X1, . . . , Xn ∈ {±1/
√
d}d drawn i.i.d. from a population with mean θ = E[Xi], setting
Zi = M(Xi) we would have E[
∥∥Zn − θ∥∥22] ≤ c0dn(ε∧ε2) . For small enough constant c0, this contra-
dicts [26, Cor. 3].
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As a consequence of Proposition 3, we can show that Algorithm 1 is order optimal for all privacy
levels ε ≤ d log 2− log 43 , improving on all previously known mechanisms for (locally) differentially
private vector release. To see this, we show that PrivUnit2 indeed produces an unbiased estimator
with small norm. See Appendix C.1 for a proof of the next lemma.
Lemma 4.1. Let Z = PrivUnit2(u, γ, p) for some u ∈ Sd−1, γ ∈ [0, 1], and p ∈ [12 , 1]. Then
E[Z] = u.
Letting γ satisfy either of the sufficient conditions (16) in PrivUnit2(·, γ, p0), where p0 =
eε0/(1 + eε0), ensures that it is (ε+ ε0)-differentially private. With these choices of γ, we then have
the following utility guarantee for the privatized vector Z.
Proposition 4. Assume that 0 ≤ ε ≤ d. Let u ∈ Sd−1 and p ≥ 12 . Then there exists a nu-
merical constant c < ∞ such that if γ saturates either of the two inequalities (16), then γ &
min{ε/√d,√ε/d}, and the output Z = PrivUnit2(u, γ, p) satisfies
‖Z‖2 ≤ c ·
√
d
ε
∨ d
(eε − 1)2 .
Additionally, E[‖Z − u‖22] . dε ∨ d(eε−1)2 .
See Appendix C.2 for a proof.
The salient point here is that the mechanism of Alg. 1 is order optimal—achieving unimprovable
dependence on the dimension d and privacy level ε—and substantially improving the earlier results
of Duchi et al. [31], who provide a different mechanism that achieves order-optimal guarantees only
when ε . 1. More generally, as we see presently, this mechanism forms the lynchpin for minimax
optimal stochastic optimization.
4.2 Privatizing unit `∞ vectors with high accuracy
We now consider privatization of vectors on the surface of the unit `∞ box, Hd := [−1, 1]d, con-
structing an ε-differentially private vector Z with the property that E[Z | u] = u for all u ∈ Hd.
The importance of this setting arises in very high-dimensional estimation and statistical learning
problems, specifically those in which the dimension d dominates the sample size n. In these cases,
mirror-descent-based methods [60, 11] have convergence rates for stochastic optimization problems
that scale as M∞R1
√
log d√
T
, where M∞ denotes the `∞-radius of the gradients ∇` and R1 the `1-radius
of the constraint set Θ in the problem (3). With the `2-based mechanisms in the previous section,
we thus address the two most important scenarios for online and stochastic optimization.
Our procedure parallels that for the `2 case, except that we now use caps of the hypercube
rather than the sphere. Given u ∈ Hd, we first round each coordinate randomly to ±1 to generate
û ∈ {−1, 1}d with E[û | u] = u. We then sample a privatized vector V ∈ {−1,+1}d such that
with probability p ≥ 12 we have V ∈ {v | 〈v, û〉 > κ}, while with the remaining probability
V ∈ {v | 〈v, û〉 ≤ κ}, where κ ∈ {0, · · · , d − 1}. We debias the resulting vector to construct Z
satisfying E[Z | u] = u. See Algorithm 2.
As in Section 4.1, we divide our analysis into a proof that Algorithm 2 provides privacy and an
argument for its utility.
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Algorithm 2 Privatized Unit Vector: PrivUnit∞
Require: u ∈ [−1, 1]d, κ ∈ {0, · · · , d− 1}, p ≥ 12 .
Round each coordinate of u ∈ [−1, 1]d to a corner of Hd:
Ûj =
{
1 w.p.
1+uj
2
−1 otherwise for j ∈ [d].
Draw random vector V via
V =
{
uniform on {v ∈ {−1,+1}d | 〈v, Û〉 > κ} with probability p
uniform on {v ∈ {−1,+1}d | 〈v, Û〉 ≤ κ} otherwise. (18)
Set τ =
d d+κ+1
2
e
d and
m = p
(
d−1
dτ−1
)∑d
`=τ ·d
(
d
`
) − (1− p) ( d−1dτ−1)∑dτ−1
`=0
(
d
`
)
return Z = 1m · V
4.2.1 Privacy analysis
We follow a similar analysis to Theorem 1 to give the precise quantity that we need to bound to
ensure (local) differential privacy. We defer the proof to Appendix A.2.
Theorem 2. Let κ ∈ {0, · · · , d− 1}, p0 = eε01+eε0 for some ε0 ≥ 0, and τ :=
d d+κ+1
2
e
d . If
log
(
dτ−1∑
`=0
(
d
`
))
− log
(
d∑
`=dτ
(
d
`
))
≤ ε (19)
then PrivUnit∞(·, κ, p0) is (ε+ ε0)-differentially private.
By approximating (19), we can understand the scaling for κ on the dimension and the pri-
vacy parameter . Specifically, we show that when  = Ω(log(d)), setting κ ≈ √εd guarantees ε
differential privacy; similarly, for any ε = O(1), setting κ ≈ ε√d gives ε-differential privacy.
Corollary 4.1. Assume that d, κ ∈ Z are both even and let p0 = eε0/(1+eε0). If 0 ≤ κ <
√
3/2d+ 1
and
ε ≥ log
(
1 + κ ·
√
2
3d+ 2
)
− log
(
1− κ ·
√
2
3d+ 2
)
, (20)
then PrivUnit∞(·, κ, p0) is (ε+ ε0)-DP. Let κ2 = κ+ 2. Then if
ε ≥ 1
2
log(2) +
1
2
log
(
d− κ22d
)
+
d
2
[(
1 +
κ2
d
)
log
(
1 +
κ2
d
)
+
(
1− κ2
d
)
log
(
1− κ2
d
)]
, (21)
PrivUnit∞(·, κ, p0) is (ε+ ε0)-DP.
4.2.2 Bias and variance
Paralleling our analysis of the `2-case, we now analyze the utility of our `∞-privatization mechanism.
We first prove that PrivUnit∞ indeed produces an unbiased estimator.
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Lemma 4.2. Let Z = PrivUnit∞(u, κ) for some κ ∈ {0, · · · , d} and u ∈ [−1, 1]. Then E[Z] = u.
See Appendix C.3 for a proof.
The results of Duchi et al. [31] imply that for u ∈ {−1, 1}d the output Z = PrivUnit∞(u, κ =
0, p) has magnitude ‖Z‖∞ .
√
d p1−p , which is
√
d e
ε+1
eε−1 for p = e
ε/(1 + eε). We can, however,
provide stronger guarantees. Letting κ satisfy the sufficient condition (19) in PrivUnit∞(·, κ, p0)
for p0 =
eε0
eε0+1 ensures that Z is (ε+ ε0)-differentially private, and we have the utility bound
Proposition 5. Let u ∈ {−1, 1}d, p ≥ 12 , and Z = PrivUnit∞(u, κ, p). Then E[Z] = u, and there
exist numerical constants 0 < c0, c1 <∞ such that the following holds.
(i) Assume that ε ≥ log d. If κ saturates the bound (21), then κ ≥ c0
√
εd and
‖Z‖∞ ≤ c1
√
d
ε
.
(ii) Assume that ε < log d. If κ saturates the bound (20), then κ ≥ c0 min{
√
d, ε
√
d}, and
‖Z‖∞ ≤ c1
√
d
min{1, ε} .
See Appendix C.4 for a proof.
Thus, comparing to the earlier guarantees of Duchi et al. [31], we see that this hypercube-cap-
based method we present in Algorithm 2 obtains no worse error in all cases of ε, and when ε ≥ log d,
the dependence on ε is substantially better. An argument paralleling that for Proposition 3 shows
that the bounds on the `∞-norm of Z are unimprovable except for ε ∈ [1, log d]; we believe a slightly
more careful probabilistic argument should show that case (i) holds for ε ≥ 1.
4.3 Privatizing the magnitude
The final component of our mechanisms for releasing unbiased vectors is to privately release single
values r ∈ [0, rmax] for some rmax < ∞. The first (Sec. 4.3.1) provides a randomized-response-
based mechanism achieving order optimal scaling for the mean-squared error E[(Z − r)2], which is
r2maxe
−2ε/3 for ε ≥ 1 (see Corollary 8 in [38]). In the second (Sec. B.2), we provide a mechanism
that achieves better relative error guarantees—important for statistical applications in which we
wish to adapt to the ease of a problem (recall the introduction), so that “easy” (small magnitude
update) examples indeed remain easy.
4.3.1 Absolute error
We first discuss a generalized randomized-response-based scheme for differentially private release
of values r ∈ [0, rmax], where rmax is some a priori upper bound on r. We fix a value k ∈ N and
then follow a three-phase procedure: first, we randomly round r to an index value J taking values
in {0, 1, 2, . . . , k} so that
E[rmaxJ/k | r] = r and bkr/rmaxc ≤ J ≤ dkr/rmaxe .
In the second step, we employ randomized response [67] over k outcomes. The third step debi-
ases this randomized quantity to obtain the estimator Z for r. We formalize the procedure in
Algorithm 3, ScalarDP.
Importantly, the mechanism ScalarDP is ε-differentially private, and we can control its accuracy
via the next lemma, whose proof we defer to Appendix B.1.
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Algorithm 3 Privatize the magnitude with absolute error: ScalarDP
Require: Magnitude r, privacy parameter ε > 0, k ∈ N, bound rmax
r ← min{r, rmax}
Sample J ∈ {0, 1, · · · , k} such that
J =
{
bkr/rmaxc w.p. (dkr/rmaxe − kr/rmax)
dkr/rmaxe otherwise.
Use randomized response to obtain
Ĵ | (J = i) =
{
i w.p. e
ε
eε+k
uniform in {0, . . . , k} \ i w.p. keε+k .
Debias Ĵ , by setting
Z = a
(
Ĵ − b
)
for a =
(
eε + k
eε − 1
)
rmax
k
and b =
k(k + 1)
2(eε + k)
.
return Z
Lemma 4.3. Let ε > 0, k ∈ N, and 0 ≤ rmax <∞. Then the mechanism ScalarDP(·, ε; k, rmax) is
ε-differentially private and for Z = ScalarDP(r, ε; k, rmax), if 0 ≤ r ≤ rmax, then E[Z] = r and
E[(Z − r)2] ≤ k + 1
eε − 1
[
r2 +
r2max
4k2
+
(2k + 1)(eε + k)r2max
6k(eε − 1)
]
+
r2max
4k2
.
By choosing k appropriately, we immediately see that we can achieve optimal [38] mean-squared
error as ε grows:
Lemma 4.4. Let k =
⌈
eε/3
⌉
. Then for Z = ScalarDP(r, ε; k, rmax),
sup
r∈[0,rmax]
E[(Z − r)2 | r] ≤ C · r2maxe−2ε/3
for a universal (numerical) constant C independent of rmax and ε.
It is also possible to develop relative error bounds rather than absolute error bounds; as the focus
of the current paper is on large-scale statistical learning and stochastic optimization rather than
scalar sampling, we include these relative error bounds and some related discussion in Appendix B.2.
They can in some circumstances provide stronger error guarantees than the absolute guarantees in
Lemma 4.4.
4.4 Asymptotic analysis with local privacy
Finally, with our development of private vector sampling mechanisms complete, we revisit the
statistical risk minimization problem (3) and our development of asymptotics in Section 3.2. Recall
that we wish to minimize L(θ) = EP [`(θ,X)] using a sample Xt
iid∼ P , t = 1, . . . , T . We consider
a stochastic gradient procedure, where we privatize each stochastic gradient ∇`(θ,X) using a
separated mechanism that obfuscates both the direction ∇`/ ‖∇`‖2 and magnitude ‖∇`‖2. Our
scheme is ε-differentially private, and we let ε1 + ε2 = ε, where we use ε1 as the privacy level for
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the direction and ε2 as the privacy level for the magnitude. For fixed ε1, we let γ(ε1) be the largest
value of γ satisfying one of the inequalities (16) so that Algorithm 1 (PrivUnit2) is ε1-differentially
private and γ(ε) & min{ε,√ε}/√d (recall Proposition 4). We use Alg. 3 to privatize the magnitude
(with a maximum scalar value rmax to be chosen), and thus we define the ε-differentially private
mechanism for privatizing a vector w by
M(w) := PrivUnit2
(
w
‖w‖2
; γ(ε1), p =
1
2
)
· ScalarDP(‖w‖2 , ε2; k = deε2/3e, rmax). (22)
Using the mechanism (22), we define Z(θ;x) := M(∇`(θ;x)), where we assume a known upper
bound rmax on ‖∇`(θ;x)‖2. The the private stochastic gradient method then iterates
θ(t+1) ← θ(t) − ηt · Z(θ(t);Xt)
for t = 1, 2, . . . and Xt
iid∼ P , where ηt is a stepsize sequence.
To see the asymptotic behavior of the average θ
(T )
= 1T
∑T
t=1 θ
(t), we will use Corollary 3.2. We
begin by computing the asymptotic variance Σpriv = E[Z(θ?;X)Z(θ?;X)>].
Lemma 4.5. Assume that 0 < ε1, ε2 ≤ d and let Z be defined as above. Let Σ = Cov(∇`(θ?;X))
and Σnorm = Cov(∇`(θ?;X)/ ‖∇`(θ?;X)‖2). Assume additionally that ‖∇`(θ?;X)‖2 ≤ rmax with
probability 1. Then there exists a numerical constant C <∞ such that
Σpriv  C · dr
2
maxe
−2ε2/3
ε1 ∧ ε21
·
(
Σnorm +
tr(Σnorm)
d
Id
)
+ C · d
ε1 ∧ ε21
·
(
Σ +
tr(Σ)
d
Id
)
.
See Appendix A.4 for the proof.
Lemma 4.5 is the key result from which our main convergence theorem builds. Combining
this result with Corollary 3.2, we obtain the following theorem, which highlights the asymptotic
convergence results possible when we use somewhat larger privacy parameters ε.
Theorem 3. Let the conditions of Lemma 4.5 hold. Define the optimal asymptotic covariance
Σ? := Cov(∇`(θ?;X)), and assume that λmin(Σ?) = λmin > 0. Let the privacy levels 0 < ε1, ε2
satisfy ε2 ≥ 32 log dε1λmin and 0 < ε1 ≤ d. Assume that the stepsizes ηt ∝ t−β for some β ∈ (1/2, 1),
and let θ(t) be generated by the private stochastic gradient method (4.4). Then
√
T
(
θ
(T ) − θ?
)
d→N (0,Σpriv)
where
Σpriv  O(1) d
ε1 ∧ ε21
∇2L(θ?)−1
(
Σ? +
tr(Σ?)
d
Id
)
∇2L(θ?)−1.
4.4.1 Optimality and alternative mechanisms
We provide some commentary on Theorem 3 by considering alternative mechanisms and optimality
results. We begin with the latter. It is first instructive to compare the asymptotic covariance Σpriv
Theorem 3 to the optimal asymptotic covariance without privacy, which is ∇2`(θ?)−1Σ?∇2`(θ?)−1
(cf. [28, 47, 66]). When the privacy level ε1 scales with the dimension, our asymptotic covariance
can is within a numerical constant of this optimal value whenever
tr(Σ?)
d
∇2L(θ?)−2  O(1) · ∇2L(θ?)−1Σ?∇2L(θ?)−1.
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When Σ? is near identity, for example, this domination in the semidefinite order holds. We can
of course never quite achieve optimal covariance, because the privacy channel forces some loss of
efficiency, but this loss of efficiency is now bounded. Even when ε1 is smaller, however, the results
of Duchi and Rogers [26] imply that in a (local) minimax sense, there must be a multiplication
of at least O(1)d/min{ε, ε2} on the covariance ∇2`(θ?)−1Σ?∇2`(θ?)−1, which Theorem 3 exhibits.
Thus, the mechanisms we have developed are indeed minimax rate optimal.
Let us consider alternative mechanisms, including related asymptotic results. First, consider
Duchi et al.’s results generalized linear model estimation [31, Sec. 5.2]. In their case, in the identical
scenario, they achieve
√
T (θ
(T ) − θ?) d→N(0,Σmax) where the asymptotic variance Σmax satisfies
Σmax  Ω(1)
(
eε + 1
eε − 1
)2
∇2L(θ?)−1
(
dΣ? + sup
x,θ
‖∇`(θ;x)‖22 Id
)
∇2L(θ?)−1.
There are two sources of looseness in this covariance, which is minimax optimal for some classes
of problems [31]. First, supx,θ ‖∇`(θ;x)‖22 > tr(Σ?) = E[‖∇`(θ?;X)‖22]. Second, the error does not
decrease for ε > 1. Letting σ2ratio := supx,θ ‖∇`(θ;x)‖22 /E[‖∇`(θ?;X)‖22] > 1 denote the ratio of the
worst case norm to its expectation, which may be arbitrarily large, we have asymptotic `22-error
scaling as
tr(Σmax) & d
ε2 ∧ 1 · tr(∇
2L(θ?)−1Σ?∇2L(θ?)−1) + σ
2
ratio
ε2 ∧ 1 · tr(Σ?) tr(∇
2L(θ?)−2)
tr(Σpriv) . d
ε2 ∧ ε · tr(∇
2L(θ?)−1Σ?∇2L(θ?)−1) + 1
ε2 ∧ ε · tr(Σ?) tr(∇
2L(θ?)−2).
The scaling of tr(Σpriv) reveals the importance of separately encoding the magnitude of ‖∇`(θ;X)‖2
and its direction—we can be adaptive to the scale of Σ? rather than depending on the worst-case
value supx,θ ‖∇`(θ;x)‖22.
Given the numerous relaxations of differential privacy [59, 33, 18] (recall Sec. 2.1, a natural
idea is to simply add noise satisfying one of these weaker definitions to the normalized vector
u = ∇`/ ‖∇`‖2 in our updates. Three considerations argue against this idea. First, these weak-
enings can never actually protect against a reconstruction breach for all possible observations z
(Definition 2.3)—they can only protect conditional on the observation z lying in some appropri-
ately high probability set (cf. [9, Thm. 1]). Second, most standard mechanisms add more noise
than ours. Third, in a minimax sense—none of the relaxations of privacy even allow convergence
rates faster than those achievable by pure ε-differentially private mechanisms [26].
Let us touch briefly on the second claim above about noise addition. In brief, our ε-differentially
private mechanisms for privatizing a vector u with ‖u‖2 ≤ 1 in Sec. 4 release Z such that E[Z |
u] = u and E[‖Z − u‖22 | u] . dmax{ε−1, ε−2}, which is unimprovable. In contrast, the Laplace
mechanism and its `2 extensions [35] satisfy E[‖Z − u‖22 | u] & d2/ε2, which which yields worse
dependence on the dimension d. Approximately differentially private schemes, which allow a δ
probability of failure where δ is typically assumed sub-polynomial in n and d [34], allow mechanisms
such as Gaussian noise addition, where Z = u+W for W ∼ N(0, C log
1
δ
ε2
) for C a numerical constant.
Evidently, these satisfy E[‖Z − u‖22 | u] & d log 1δ/ε2, which again is looser than the mechanisms we
provide whenever ε . log 1δ . Other relaxations—Re´nyi differential privacy [59] and concentrated
differential privacy [33, 18]—similarly cannot yield improvements in a minimax sense [26], and they
provide guarantees that the posterior beliefs of an adversary change little only on average.
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5 Empirical Results
We present a series of empirical results in different settings, demonstrating the performance of our
(minimax optimal) procedures for stochastic optimization in a variety of scenarios. In the settings
we consider—which simulate a large dataset distributed across multiple devices or units—the non-
private alternative is to communicate and aggregate model updates without local or centralized
privacy. We perform both simulated experiments (Sec. 5.1)—where we can more precisely show
losses due to privacy—and experiments on a large image classification task and language modeling.
Because of the potential applications in modern practice, we use both classical (logistic regres-
sion) models as well as modern deep network architectures [49], where we of course cannot prove
convergence but still guarantee privacy.
In each experiment, we use the `2-spherical cap sampling mechanisms of Alg. 1 in (ε1, ε2)-
separated differentially private mechanisms (22). Letting γ(ε) be the largest value of γ satisfying
the privacy condition (16) in our `2 mechanisms and p(ε) =
eε
1+eε , for any vector w ∈ Rd, we use
M(w) := PrivUnit2
(
w
‖w‖2
; γ(0.99ε1), p(.01ε1)
)
· ScalarDP
(
‖w‖2 , ε2, k =
⌈
eε2/3
⌉
, rmax
)
. (23)
In our experiments, we set ε2 = 10, which is large enough (recall Theorem 3) so that its contribution
to the final error is negligible relative to the sampling error in PrivUnit2 but of smaller order than
ε1. In each experiment, we vary ε1, the dominant term in the asymptotic convergence of Theorem 3.
Our goal is to investigate whether private federated statistical learning—which includes sepa-
rated differentially private mechanisms (providing local privacy protections against reconstruction)
and central differential privacy—can perform nearly as well as models fit without privacy. We
present results both for models trained tabula rasa (from scratch, with random initialization) as
well as those pre-trained on other data, which is natural when we wish to update a model to
better reflect a new population. Within each figure plotting results, we plot the accuracy of the
current model θk at iterate k versus the best accuracy achieved by a non-private model, providing
error bars over multiple trials. In short, we find the following: we can get to reasonably strong
accuracy—nearly comparable with non-private methods—for large values of local privacy parame-
ter ε. However, with smaller values, even using (provably) optimal procedures can cause substantial
performance degradation.
Centralized aggregation In our large-scale real-data experiments, we include the centralized
privacy protections by projecting (13) the updates onto an `2-ball of radius ρ, adding N(0, σ
2I)
noise with σ2 = Tq2ρ2/εα, where q is the fraction of users we subsample, T the total number
of updates, and εα the Re´nyi-privacy parameter we choose. In our experiments, we report the
resulting centralized privacy levels for each experiment.
We make a concession to computational feasibility, slightly reducing the value σ that we actually
use in our experiments beyond the theoretical recommendations. In particular, we use batch size
m, corresponding to q = m/N , of at most 200 and test σ ∈ {.001, .002, .005, .01}, depending on our
experiment, which of course requires either larger εα above or larger subsampling rate q than our
effective rate. As McMahan et al. [55] note, increasing this batch size has negligible effect on the
accuracy of the centralized model, so that we report results (following [55]) that use this inflated
batch size estimate from a population of size N = 10,000,000.
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5.1 Simulated logistic regression experiments
Our first collection of experiments focuses on a logistic regression experiment in which we can
exactly evaluate population losses and errors in parameter recovery. We generate data pairs
(Xi, Yi) ∈ Sd−1 × {±1} according to the logistic model
pθ(y | x) = 1
1 + exp(−yθTx) ,
where the vectors Xi are i.i.d. uniform on the sphere Sd−1. In each experiment we choose the true
parameter θ? uniformly on τ ·Sd−1 so that τ > 0 reflects the signal-to-noise ratio in the problem. In
this case, we perform the stochastic gradient method as in Sections 3.2 and 4.4 on the logistic loss
`(θ; (x, y)) = log(1 + e−yxT θ). For a given privacy level ε, in the update (22) we use the parameters
ε1 =
13ε
16
, ε2 =
ε
8
, p =
eε/16
1 + eε/16
,
that is, we privatize the direction g/ ‖g‖2 with ε1 = 1316ε-local privacy and flip probability p = e
ε/16
1+eε/16
and the magnitude ‖g‖2 using ε8 privacy.
Within each experiment, we draw a sample (Xi, Yi)
iid∼ P of size N as above, and then perform
N stochastic gradient iterations using the mechanism (22). We choose stepsizes ηk = η0k
−β for β =
.51, where the choice η0 =
√
ε/d, so that (for large magnitude noises) the stepsize is smaller—this
reflects the “optimal” stepsize tuning in standard stochastic gradient methods [60]. Letting L(θ) =
E[`(θ;X,Y )] for the given distribution, we then evaluate L(θk)−L(θ?) and ‖θk − θ?‖2 over iterations
k, where θ? = argminθ L(θ). In Figure 3, we plot the results of experiments using dimension d = 500,
sample size N = 105, and signal size τ = 4. (Other dimensions, sample sizes, and signal strengths
yield qualitatively similar results.) We perform 50 independent experiments, plotting aggregate
results. On the left plot, we plot the error of the private stochastic gradient methods, which—
as we note earlier—are (minimax) optimal for this problem. We give 90% confidence intervals
across all the experiments, and we see roughly the expected behavior: as the privacy parameter ε
increases, performance approaches that of the non-private stochastic gradient estimator. The right
plot provides box plots of the error for the stochastic gradient methods as well as the non-private
maximum likelihood estimator.
Perhaps the most salient point here is that, to maintain utility, we require non-trivially large
privacy parameters for this (reasonably) high-dimensional problem; without ε ≥ d/8 the perfor-
mance is essentially no better than that of a model using θ = 0, that is, random guessing. (And
alternative stepsize choices η0 do not help.)
5.2 Fitting deep models tabula rasa
We now present results on deep network model fitting for image classification tasks when we ini-
tialize the model to have i.i.d. N(0, 1) parameters. Recall our mechanism (23), so that we allocate
γ = γ(0.99ε1) for the spherical cap threshold and p = p(.01 · ε1) for the probability with which
we choose a particular spherical cap in the randomization PrivUnit2(·, γ, p), which ensures ε1-
differential privacy.
MNIST We begin with results on the MNIST handwritten digit recognition dataset [48]. We use
the default six-layer convolutional neural net (CNN) architecture of the TensorFlow tutorial [64]
with default optimizer. The network contains d = 3, 274, 634 parameters. We proced in iterations
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Figure 3. Logistic regression simulations with sample size N = 105 and dimension d = 500.
Left: optimization error versus iteration k in the stochastic gradient iteration, with 95% error bars.
Right: box plot error ‖θ − θ?‖2 of the averaged iterate θN = 1N
∑N
k=1 θk over the stochastic gradient
methods. The horizontal axis indexes privacy level ε, and θ̂mle denotes the error of the maximum
likelihood estimator.
MNIST parameters CIFAR parameters
ε1 γ(0.99ε1) p =
e.01ε1
1+e.01ε1
ε1 γ(0.99ε1) p =
e.01ε1
1+e.01ε1
500 0.01729 1.0 5000 0.09598 1.0
250 0.01217 0.924 1000 0.04291 1.0
100 0.00760 0.731 500 0.03027 0.993
50 0.00526 0.622 100 0.01331 0.731
Table 1: Parameters in experiments training six-layer CNNs from random initializations.
t = 1, 2, . . . , T . In each round, we randomly sample B = 200 sets of m = 100 images, then on each
batch b = 1, 2, . . . , B, of m images, approximate the update (11) by performing 5 local gradient
steps on 1m
∑m
j=1 `(θ, xb,j) for batch b to obtain local update ∆b. To sample magnitude ‖∆b‖2 of
these local updates, we use Alg. 3, ScalarDP(·, ε2 = 10, k =
⌈
e2ε2/3
⌉
= 29, rmax = 5), and for
the unit vector direction privatization we use Alg. 1 (PrivUnit2) and vary ε1 across experiments.
Table 1 summarizes the privacy parameters we use, with corresponding spherical cap radius γ and
probability of sampling the correct cap p in Alg. 1. We use update radius (the `2-ball to which
we project the stochastic gradient updates) ρ = 100 and standard deviation σ = .005, so that the
moment-accountant [1] guarantees that (if we use a population of size N = 107) and 100 rounds,
the resulting model enjoys (εcent = 1.9, δ = 10
−9)-central differential privacy (Def. 2.1). We plot
standard errors over 20 trials in Fig. 4(a).
CIFAR10 We now present results on the CIFAR10 dataset [45]. We use the same CNN model
architecture as in the Tensorflow tutorial [20] with an Adam optimizer and dimension d = 1,068,298.
We preprocess the data as in the Tensorflow tutorial so that the inputs are 24×24 with 3 channels.
In analogy to our experiment for MNIST, we shuffle the training images into B = 75 batches, each
with m = 500 images, approximating the update (11) via 5 local gradient steps on the m images. As
in the mechanism (23), we use ScalarDP(·, ε2 = 10, k = deε2/3e, rmax = 2) to sample the magnitude
of the updates and PrivUnit2(·, γ(0.99 · ε1), p(0.01 · ε1)), varying ε1, for the direction. See Table 1
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for the privacy parameters that we set in each experiment. We present the results in Figure 4(b)
for mechanisms that satisfy (ε1, ε2 = 10)-separated DP where ε1 ∈ {100, 500, 1000, 5000}. The
corresponding `2-projection radius ρ = 30 and centralized noise addition of variance σ = .002
guarantee, again via the moments-accountant [1], that with a “true” population size N = 107 and
T = 200 rounds, the final model is (εcent = 1.76, δ = 10
−9)-differneitally private. We plot the
difference in accuracies between federated learning and our private federated learning system with
standard errors over 20 trials.
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Figure 4. Accuracy plots for image classification comparing the private federated learning approach
(indexed by privacy parameter ε1) with non-private model updates. Horizontal axis indexes number
of stochastic gradient updates, vertical the gap in test-set accuracy between the final non-private
model and the private model θk at the given round. (a) MNIST dataset. (b) CIFAR-10 dataset.
5.3 Pretrained models
Our final set of experiments investigates refitting a model on a new population. Given the large
number of well-established and downloadable deep networks, we view this fine-tuning as a realistic
use case for private federated learning.
Image classification on Flickr over 100 classes We perform our first model tuning exper-
iment on a pre-trained ResNet50v2 network [41] fit using ImageNet data [25], whose reference
implementation is available at the website [50]. Beginning from the pre-fit model, we consider only
the final (softmax) layer and final convolutional layer of the network to be modifiable, refitting the
model to perform 100-class multiclass classification on a subset of the Flickr corpus [65]. There are
d = 1,255,524 parameters.
We construct a subsample for each of our experiments as follows. We choose 100 classes (uni-
formly at random) and 2000 images from each class, yielding 2 · 105 images. We randomly permute
these into a 9:1 train/test split. In each iteration of the stochastic gradient method, we randomly
choose B = 100 sets of m = 128 images, performing an approximation to the proximal-point
update (11) using 15 gradient steps for each batch b = 1, 2, . . . , B. Again following the mecha-
nism (23), for the magnitude of each update we use ScalarDP(·, ε2 = 10, k = deε2/3e, rmax = 10),
while for the unit direction we use PrivUnit2(·, γ(0.99 · ε1), p(0.01 · ε1)) while varying ε1. We
present the results in Figure 5(a) for mechanisms that satisfy (ε1, ε2 = 10)-separated DP where
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ε1 ∈ {50, 100, 500, 5000}. We plot the difference in accuracies between federated learning and our
private federated learning system with standard errors over 12 trials.
Next Word Prediction For our final experiment, we investigate performance of the private
federated learning system for next word prediction in a deep word-prediction model. We pretrain
an LSTM on a corpus consisting of all Wikipedia entries as of October 1, 2016 [69]. Our model
architecture consists of one long-term-short-term memory (LSTM) cell [63] with a word embedding
matrix [58] that maps each of 25,003 tokens j (including an unknown, end of sentence, and beginning
of sentence tokens) to a vector wj in dimension 256. We use the Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK)
tokenization procedure to tokenize each sentence and word [51]. The LSTM cell has 256 units,
which leads to 526,336 trainable parameters. Then we decode back into 25,003 tokens. In total,
there are d = 13,352,875 trainable parameters in the LSTM.
We refit this pretrained LSTM on a corpus of all user comments on the website Reddit from
November 2017 [10], again using the NLTK tokenization procedure [51]. Each stochastic update (13)
consists of choosing a random batch of B = 200 collections of m = 1000 sentences, performing the
local updates (11) approximately by computing 10 gradient steps within each batch b = 1, . . . , B.
We use update parameters ScalarDP(·, ε2 = 10, k = deε2/3e, rmax = 5) and PrivUnit2(·, γ(0.99 ·
ε1), p(0.01 · ε1)) while varying ε1. We present results in Figure 5(b) for mechanisms that satisfy
(ε1, ε2 = 10)-separated DP where ε1 ∈ {100, 500, 2500, 10000}. We choose the centralized projection
ρ = 100 and noise σ in the aggregation (13) to guarantee (εcent = 3, δ = 10
−9) differential privacy
after T = 200 rounds. We plot the difference in accuracies between federated learning and our
private federated learning system with standard errors over 20 trials.
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Figure 5. Accuracy plots for pretrained models comparing our private federated learning approach
(labeled SDP with the corresponding ε1 parameter) with various privacy parameter ε and federated
learning with clear model updates (labeled Clear). (a) Top 5 accuracy image classification: top 100
classes from Flickr data with Resnet50v2 model pretrained on ImageNet. (b) Next Word Prediction:
Reddit data with pretrained LSTM on Wikipedia data with initial accuracy roughly 15.5%.
6 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we have described the analysis and implementation—with new, minimax optimal
privatization mechanisms—of a system for large-scale distributed model fitting, or federated learn-
ing. In such systems, users may prefer local privacy protections, though as this and previous
27
work [31, 26] and make clear, providing small ε-local differential privacy makes model-fitting ex-
tremely challenging. Thus, it is of substantial interest to understand what is possible in large ε
regimes, and the corresponding types of privacy such mechanisms provide; we have provided one
such justification via prior beliefs and reconstruction probabilities from oblivious adversaries. We
believe understanding appropriate privacy barriers, which provide different types of protections at
different levels, will be important for the practical adoption of private procedures, and we hope
that the current paper provides impetus in this direction.
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A Technical proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2.3
We prove each result in turn. We begin with the precision bound. Fix p > 0, and assume that
pvT1 ≥ vTE[X]. Then using that Var(vj(Xj − E[Xj ])) ≤ vj mj , and is 0 for j < m. By Bernstein’s
inequality, we then have
P(precision(v,X) ≥ p) = P(vT (X − E[X]) ≥ pvT1− vTE[X])
≤ exp
(
− (pv
T1− vTE[X])2
2
∑
j>m vjVar(Xj) +
2
3(pv
T1− vTE[X])
)
≤ exp
(
−min
{
(pvT1− vTE[X])2
4
∑
j>m vjVar(Xj)
,
3
4
(pvT1− vTE[X])
})
(24)
For vT1 ≥ γm, assuming that p ≥ 1γ , we have
pvT1−vTE[X] ≥ pγm−
γm∑
j=1
E[Xj ] = pγm−m−
γm∑
j=m+1
m
j
≥ (pγ−1)m−m
∫ γm
m
1
t
dt = (pγ−1−log γ)m.
For the first term in the exponent (24), the ratio again is maximized by v = (1γm,0d−γm), and we
have
d∑
j=m+1
vjVar(Xj) ≤
γm∑
j>m
m
j
≤ m
∫ γm
m
1
t
dt = m log γ.
Substituting these bounds in Eq. (24), we have
P(precision(v,X) ≥ p) ≤ exp
(
−min
{
(pγ − 1− log γ)2m
4 log γ
,
3
4
(pγ − 1− log γ)m
})
.
For the recall bounds, we perform a similar derivation, assuming r ≤ 12 so that (1− r) ≥ r. We
temporarily assume (r1− v)TE[X] ≥ 0; we shall see that this holds. By Bernstein’s inequality, we
have
P(recall(v,X) ≥ r) = P(vTX ≥ r1TX) = P((v − r1)T (X − E[X]) ≥ (r1− v)TE[X])
≤ exp
(
− ((r1− v)
TE[X])2
2
∑
j>m(r − vj)2Var(Xj) + 23(r1− v)TE[X]
)
≤ exp
(
−min
{
((r1− v)TE[X])2
4
∑
j>m(r − vj)2Var(Xj)
,
3
4
(r1− v)TE[X]
})
. (25)
We consider each term in the minimum (25) in turn. When
∑
j vj ≤ γm, we have∑
j>m
(r − vj)Var(Xj)2 ≤ m(1− r)2
∫ d
m
1
t
dt = m(1− r)2 log d
m
,
while
(r1− v)TE[X] ≥ r1TE[X]−
γm∑
j=1
E[X] = rm+ r
d∑
j=m+1
m
j
−m−
γm∑
j=m+1
E[Xj ]
≥ rm+ rm
∫ d
m+1
1
t
dt−m−m
∫ γm
m
1
t
dt = m
[
r
(
1 + log
d
m+ 1
)
− 1− log γ
]
.
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Substituting into inequality (25) gives the second result of the lemma.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Let u ∈ {−1,+1}d and U ∼ Uni({−1,+1}d). The vector V ∈ {−1, 1}d sampled as in (18), has
p.m.f.
p(v | u) ∝
{
1/P(〈U, u〉 > κ) if 〈v, u〉 > κ
1/P(〈U, u〉 < κ) if 〈v, u〉 ≤ κ.
The event that 〈U, u〉 = κ when d+κ+12 ∈ Z implies that U and umatch in exactly d+κ+12 coordinates;
the number of such matches is
(
d
(d+κ+1)/2
)
. Computing the binomial sum, we have
P(〈U, u〉 > κ) = 1
2d
d∑
`=d d+κ+1
2
e
(
d
`
)
and P(〈U, u〉 ≤ κ) = 1
2d
d d+κ+1
2
e−1∑
`=0
(
d
`
)
.
As P(〈U, u〉 > κ) is decreasing in κ for any u, u′ ∈ {−1,+1}d and v ∈ {−1, 1}d we have
p(v | u)
p(v | u′) ≤
p0
1− p0 ·
P(〈U, u′〉 ≤ κ)
P(〈U, u〉 > κ) = e
ε0 ·
∑dτ−1
`=0
(
d
`
)∑d
`=dτ
(
d
`
) ,
where τ = d(d+ κ)/2e. Bounding this by eε+ε0 gives the result.
A.3 Proof of Corollary 4.1
Using Theorem 2, we seek to bound the quantity (19) for various κ values. We first analyze the
case when κ ≤ √3/2d+ 1. We use the following claim to bound each term in the summation in
this case.
Claim A.1 (See Problem 1 in [44]). For even d ≥ 2, we have(
d
d/2
)
≤ 2
d+1/2
√
3d+ 2
Thus, when κ <
√
3d+2
2 ,
log
(
dτ−1∑
`=0
(
d
`
))
− log
(
d∑
`=dτ
(
d
`
))
= log
1/2 + 1
2d
·
dτ−1∑
`=d/2
(
d
`
)− log
1/2− 1
2d
dτ−1∑
`=d/2
(
d
`
)
≤ log
(
1 + κ ·
(√
2
3d+ 2
))
− log
(
1− κ ·
(√
2
3d+ 2
))
.
Hence, to ensure ε-differential privacy, it suffices to have
ε ≥ log
(
1 + κ ·
√
2
3d+ 2
)
− log
(
1− κ ·
√
2
3d+ 2
)
,
so Eq. (20) follows.
We now consider the case where  = Ω(log(d)). We use the following claim.
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Claim A.2 (Lemma 4.7.2 in [4]). Let Z ∼ Bin (d, 1/2). Then for 0 < λ < 1, we have
P(Z ≥ dλ) ≥ 1√
8dλ(1− λ) exp (−dDkl (λ||1/2))
We then use this to obtain the following bound:
log
(
dτ−1∑
`=0
(
d
`
))
− log
(
d∑
`=dτ
(
d
`
))
≤ 1
2
log (8dτ(1− τ)) + dDkl (τ ||1/2)
To ensure ε-differential privacy, it is thus sufficient, for τ :=
d d+κ+1
2
e
d , to have
ε ≥ 1
2
log (8 · dτ(1− τ)) + d ·Dkl (τ ||1/2) ,
which implies the final claim of the corollary.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 4.5
For shorthand, define the radius R = ‖∇`(θ?;X)‖2, γ = γ(ε1), let U = ∇`(θ?;X)/ ‖∇`(θ?;X)‖2,
and write
Z1 = PrivUnit2 (U ; γ, p = 1/2) Z2 = ScalarDP(R, ε2; k = deε2/3e, rmax)
so that Z = Z1Z2. Using that E[(Z2 −R)2 | R] ≤ O(r2maxe−2ε2/3) by Lemma 4.4, we have
E[Z(θ?;X)Z(θ?;X)>] = E
[
E
[
Z1Z
>
1 | U
]
· E [Z22 | R]]
= E
[
E
[
Z1Z
>
1 | U
]
· E [(Z2 −R)2 | R]]+ E [R2 · E[Z1Z>1 | U ]]
 O(1)r2maxe−2ε2/3 · E
[
E
[
Z1Z
>
1 | U
]]
+ E
[
R2 · E[Z1Z>1 | U ]
]
. (26)
We now focus on the term E[Z1Z>1 | U ]. Recall that V is uniform on {v ∈ Sd−1 : 〈v, u〉 ≥ γ} with
probability 12 and uniform on the complement {v ∈ Sd−1 : 〈v, u〉 < γ} otherwise (Eq. (14)). Then
for W ∼ Uni(Sd−1), we obtain E[V V > | u] = 12E[WW> | 〈W,u〉 ≥ γ] + 12E[WW> | 〈W,u〉 < γ],
where
E[WW> | 〈W,u〉 ≥ γ]  uu>+ 1− γ
2
d− 1 (Id−uu
>) and E[WW> | 〈W,u〉 ≤ γ]  uu>+ 1
d
(Id−uu>).
Both of these are in turn bounded by uu> + (1/d)Id. Using that the normalization m defined in
Eq. (15) satisfies m & min{ε1,√ε1}/
√
d by Proposition 4, we obtain
E[Z1Z>1 | U = u] 
1
m2
uu> +
1
dm2
Id  d
ε1 ∧ ε21
uu> +
1
ε1 ∧ ε21
Id.
Substituting this bound into our earlier inequality (26) and using that RU = ∇`(θ?;X), we
obtain
E[Z(θ?;X)Z(θ?;X)>]  O(1) · dr
2
maxe
−2ε2/3
ε1 ∧ ε21
· E[UU> + (1/d)Id]
+O(1) ·
(
d
ε1 ∧ ε21
· E
[
∇`(θ?;X)∇`(θ?;X)>
]
+
1
ε1 ∧ ε21
· E
[
‖∇`(θ?;X)‖22 Id
])
.
Noting that tr(Cov(W )) = E[‖W‖22] for any random vector W gives the lemma.
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B Scalar sampling
B.1 Proof of Lemma 4.3
That the mechanism is ε-differentially private is immediate as randomized response is ε-differentially
private. To prove that Z is unbiased, we note that
E[J ] =
kr
rmax
and E[Z | J ] = rmax
k
J,
so that E[Z] = rmaxr E[J ] = r. To develop the bounds on the variance of Z, we use the standard
decomposition of variance into conditional variances, as
Var(Z) = E[(Z − r)2] = E [Var [Z | J ]] + Var [E [Z | J ]] = E[Var[Z | J ]] + r
2
max
k2
Var[J ].
We have Var[Z | J ] = a2 ·Var[Ĵ | J ]. Further, we have
E[Ĵ2 | J ] =
(
eε − 1
eε + k
)
· J2 +
(
1
eε + k
)
·
k∑
j=0
j2 and E[Ĵ | J ] =
(
eε − 1
eε + k
)
· J +
(
1
eε + k
)
·
k∑
j=0
j.
Combining the equalities and using that Var(Y ) = E[Y 2]− E[Y ]2, we have
Var[Ĵ | J ] =
(
eε − 1
eε + k
)2
·
((
eε + k
eε − 1 − 1
)
· J2 − k(k + 1)
eε − 1 · J +
k(k + 1)(2k + 1)(eε + k)
6(eε − 1)2 −
k2(k + 1)2
4(eε − 1)2
)
.
We then have the conditional variance
Var[Z | J ] = r
2
max
(eε − 1)2 ·
(
(k + 1)(eε − 1)
k2
· J2 − (k + 1)(e
ε − 1)
k
J +
(k + 1)(2k + 1)(eε + k)
6k
− (k + 1)
2
4
)
.
Now, note that J is a Bernoulli sample taking values in {bkr/rmaxc , dkr/rmaxe}. Thus, recalling
the notation Dec(t) = dte − t for the decimal part of a number, we have Var(J) = Dec( krrmax )(1 −
Dec( krrmax )). Substituting all of these above and using that E[J
2] = Var(J) +E[J ]2 = Var(J) + k2r2
r2max
,
we obtain
Var(Z)
=
r2max
(eε − 1)2 ·
(
(k + 1)(eε − 1)
k2
(
k2r2
r2max
+ Dec(kr/rmax)(1− Dec(kr/rmax))
)
. . .
− (k + 1)(eε − 1) r
rmax
+
(k + 1)(2k + 1)(eε + k)
6k
− (k + 1)
2
4
)
+
r2max
k2
Dec(kr/rmax)(1− Dec(kr/rmax))
≤ k + 1
eε − 1
[
r2 +
r2max
4k2
− rrmax + (2k + 1)(e
ε + k)r2max
6k(eε − 1) −
k + 1
4(eε − 1)
]
+
r2max
4k2
where we have used that p(1−p) ≤ 14 for all p ∈ [0, 1]. Ignoring the negative terms gives the result.
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B.2 Sampling scalars with relative error
As our discussion in the introductory Section 1.2 shows, to develop optimal learning procedures it
is frequently important to know when the problem is easy—observations are low variance—and for
this, releasing scalars with relative error can be important. Consequently, we consider an alternative
mechanism that first breaks the range [0, rmax] into intervals of increasing length based on a fixed
accuracy α > 0, k ∈ N, and ν > 1, where we define the intervals
E0 = [0, να], Ei = [ν
iα, νi+1α] for i = 1, . . . , k − 1. (27)
The resulting mechanism works as follows: we determine the interval that r belongs to, we randomly
round r to an endpoint of the interval (in an unbiased way), then use randomized response to obtain
a differentially private quantity, which we then debias. We formalize the algorithm in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Privatize the magnitude with relative error: ScalarRelDP
Require: Magnitude r, privacy parameter ε > 0, integer k, accuracy α > 0, ν > 1, bound rmax.
r ← min{r, rmax}
Form the intervals {E0, E1, · · · , Ek−1} given in (27) and let i∗ be the index such that r ∈ Ei∗ .
Sample J ∈ {0, 1, · · · , k} such that
J =
{
0 w.p. να−rνα
1 w.p. rνα
if i∗ = 0 and J =
i
∗ w.p. ν
i∗+1α−r
νi∗ (ν−1)α
i∗ + 1 w.p. r−ν
i∗α
νi∗ (ν−1)α
if i∗ ≥ 1.
Use randomized response to obtain Ĵ
Ĵ | (J = i) =
{
i w.p. e
ε
eε+k
uniform in {0, . . . , k} \ i w.p. keε+k .
Set J˜ = ν Jˆ · 1
{
Jˆ ≥ 1
}
Debias J˜ , by setting
Z = a
(
J˜ − b
)
for a = α ·
(
eε + k
eε − 1
)
and b =
1
eε + k
·
k∑
j=1
νj .
return Z
As in the absolute erorr case, we can provide an upper bound on the error of the mechanism
ScalarRelDP, though in this case—up to the small accuracy α—our error guarantee is relative.
Lemma B.1. Fix α > 0, k ∈ N, and ν > 1. Then Z = ScalarRelDP(·, ε; k, α, ν, rmax) is ε-
differentially private and for r < rmax, we have E[Z | r] = r and
E[(Z − r)2 | r]
(r ∨ α)2 ≤
(k + 1)
(eε − 1)ν
2 +
(
ν2k · (eε + k)
(eε − 1)2
)(
1− ν−2k
1− ν−2
)
+ (ν − 1)2.
See Appendix B.3 for a proof of Lemma B.1.
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We perform a few calculations with Lemma B.1 when k ≤ eε. Let ν = 1 + ∆ for a ∆ ∈ (0, 1) to
be chosen, and note that the choice
k =
⌈
log rmaxα
log ν
⌉
≈ log
rmax
α
∆
is the smallest value of k that gives νkα ≥ rmax. Let α = rmaxα0, so that ν2k ≈ 1α20 . Hence, from
Lemma B.1 we have the truncated relative error bound
E[(Z − r)2 | r]
(r ∨ rmaxα0)2 .
k
eε
+
e−ε
α20 ·∆
+ ∆2 = e−ε
(
log
1
α0
+
1
α20
)
·
(
1
∆
)
+ ∆2 . 1
eεα20∆
+ ∆2.
We assume the relative accuracy threshold α/rmax = α0 & e−ε/2. Then setting ∆ = α−2/30 e−ε/3
gives
E[(Z − r)2 | r]
(r ∨ rmaxα0)2 . α
−4/3
0 e
−2ε/3. (28)
Let us compare with Lemma 4.4, which yields
E[(Z − r)2 | r] = O
(
r2maxe
−2ε/3
)
.
The choice α0 = 1 in inequality (28) shows that the geometrically-binned mechanism can recover
this bound. For r ≤ rmaxα0, the former inequality (28) is stronger; for example, the choice α0 =
e−ε/4 yields that E[(Z−r)2 | r] = O(r2maxe−5ε/6) for r ≤ rmaxe−ε/4, and E[(Z−r)2 | r] = O(r2e−ε/3)
otherwise.
B.3 Proof of Lemma B.1
To see that ScalarRelDP(·, k, α, ν; ε, rmax) is differentially private, we point out that randomized
response is ε-DP and then DP is closed under post-processing. To see that Z is unbiased, note that
E[J˜ | J = i] =
(
eε − 1
eε + k
)
νi1 {i ≥ 1}+ 1
eε + k
k∑
j=1
νj ,
and thus for r ∈ Ei∗ ,
E[Z] = a · (E[Jˆ ]− b) = α ·
(
eε + k
eε − 1
)(eε − 1
eε + k
)
E[νJ1 {J ≥ 1}] + 1
eε + k
·
k∑
j=1
νj − 1
eε + k
·
k∑
j=1
νj

= α · E [νJ1 {J ≥ 1}]
= α ·
[
1 {i∗ = 0} ·
( r
αν
)
· ν + 1 {i∗ ≥ 1} ·
((
νi
∗+1α− r
νi∗(ν − 1)α
)
· νi∗ +
(
r − νi∗α
νi∗(ν − 1)α
)
· νi∗+1
)]
= 1 {i∗ = 0} · r + 1 {i∗ ≥ 1} · r = r
Consider the following mean squared error terms
E
[
(r − ανJ · 1 {J ≥ 1})2 | r ∈ E0
]
= r2
(
1− r
αν
)
+ (r − αν)2
( r
αν
)
= r (αν − r) ≤ (να)2
And for i∗ ≥ 1
E
[
(r − ανJ · 1 {J ≥ 1})2 | r ∈ Ei∗
] ≤ (νi∗+1α− νi∗α)2 = ν2i∗(νi∗ − 1)2α2.
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We then bound the conditional expectation
Var(Z | J = i∗) = a2Var(J˜ | J = i∗) = α2 ·
(
eε + k
eε − 1
)
·Var(J˜ | J = i∗),
Now we note that
Var(J˜ | J = i∗) =
(
eε − 1
eε + k
)
· ν2i∗1 {i∗ ≥ 1}+
(
1
eε + k
)
·
k∑
j=1
ν2j
−
(eε − 1
eε + k
)
· νi∗1 {i∗ ≥ 1}+
(
1
eε + k
)
·
k∑
j=1
νj
2
≤
(
(k + 1)(eε − 1)
(eε + k)2
)
· ν2i∗1 {i∗ ≥ 1}+
(
1
eε + k
)
· ν2k ·
k−1∑
j=0
ν−2j
=
(
(k + 1)(eε − 1)
(eε + k)2
)
· ν2i∗1 {i∗ ≥ 1}+
(
1
eε + k
)
· ν2k ·
(
1− ν−2k
1− ν−2
)
.
Now, if r ∈ Ei∗ , we have that νi∗α ≤ (r ∨ α) ≤ νi∗+1α, and thus
E[(Z − r)2]
(r ∨ α)2 ≤
α2
(r ∨ α)2 ·
(
eε + k
eε − 1
)2
·
[
(k + 1)(eε − 1)
(eε + k)2
ν2(i
∗+1) +
ν2k
eε + k
(
·1− ν
−2k
1− ν−2
)]
+
α2
(r ∨ α)2 · ν
2i∗(ν − 1)2
≤ (k + 1)
(eε − 1)ν
2 +
(
ν2k · (eε + k)
(eε − 1)2
)(
1− ν−2k
1− ν−2
)
+ (ν − 1)2,
as desired.
C Proofs of utility in private sampling mechanisms
C.1 Proof of Lemma 4.1
Let u ∈ Sd−1 and U ∈ Sd−1 be a uniform random variable on the unit sphere. Then rotational
symmetry implies that for some γ+ > 0 > γ−,
E[U | 〈U, u〉 ≥ γ] = γ+ · u and E[U | 〈U, u〉 < γ] = γ− · u,
and similarly, the random vector V in Algorithm 1 satisfies
E[V | u] = pE[U | 〈U, u〉 ≥ γ] + (1− p) · E[U | 〈U, u〉 < γ] = p(γ+ + γ−) · u.
By rotational symetry, we may assume u = e1, the first standard basis vector, without loss of
generality. We now compute the normalization constant. Letting U ∼ Uni(Sd−1) have coordinates
U1, . . . , Ud, we marginally Ui
dist
= 2B − 1 where B ∼ Beta(d−12 , d−12 ). Now, we note that
γ+ = E[U1 | U1 ≥ γ] = E[2B − 1 | B ≥ 1+γ2 ] and γ− = E[U1 | U1 < γ] = E[2B − 1 | B < 1+γ2 ]
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and that if B ∼ Beta(α, β), then for 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1, we have
E[B | B ≥ τ ] = 1
B(α, β) · P(B ≥ τ)
∫ 1
τ
xα(1− x)β−1dx = B(α+ 1, β)−B(τ ;α+ 1, β)
B(α, β)−B(τ ;α, β)
and similarly E[B | B < τ ] = B(τ ;α+1,β)B(τ ;α,β) . Using that B(τ ;α+1, α) = B(α+1, α)[B(τ ;α,α)B(α,α) − τ
α(1−τ)α
αB(α,α) ]
and B(α+1, α) = 12B(α, α), then substituting in our calculation for γ+ and γ−, we have for τ =
1+γ
2
and α = d−12 that
γ+ =
1
α · 2d−1 ·
(1− γ2)α
B(α, α)−B(τ ;α, α) and γ− =
−1
α2d−1
· (1− γ
2)α
B(τ ;α, α)
Consequently, E[V | u] = (pγ+ + (1 − p)γ−)u, and if Z = PrivUnit2(u, γ, p) we have E[Z] = u as
desired.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Recall from the proof of Lemma 4.1 that Z = 1pγ++(1−p)γ−V , where E[U | 〈U, u〉 ≥ γ] = γ+ · u and
E[U | 〈U, u〉 < γ] = γ− · u for U = (U1, · · · , Ud) ∼ Uni(Sd−1), so that γ+ = E[U1 | U1 ≥ γ] ≥ γ
and, using E[|U1|] ≤ E[U21 ]1/2 ≤ 1/
√
d, we have γ− = E[U1 | U1 ≤ γ] ∈ [−E[|U1|], 0] ∈ [−1/
√
d, 0].
Summarizing, we always have
γ ≤ γ+ ≤ 1, − 1√
d
≤ γ− ≤ 0, and |γ+| > |γ−|.
As a consequence, as the norm of V is 1 and ‖Z‖2 = 1/(pγ+ + (1 − p)γ−), which is decreasing
to 1/γ+ as p ↑ 1, we always have ‖Z‖2 ≤ 2γ++γ− and we may assume w.l.o.g. that p = 12 in the
remainder of the derivation.
Now, we consider three cases in the inequalities (16), deriving lower bounds on γ+ + γ− for
each.
1. First, assume 5 ≤ ε ≤ 2 log d. Let γ = γ0
√
2/d for some γ0 ≥ 1. Then the choice γ0 = 1
guarantees that second inequality of (16b) holds, while we note that we must have γ20 ≤ dd−1ε,
as otherwise d−12 log(1 − γ20 2d) ≤ −d−1d γ20 < −ε, contradicting the inequality (16b). For γ0 ∈
[1,
√
d
d−1ε], we have log(1− γ20 2d) ≥ −
8γ20
3d for sufficiently large d, and solving the first inequality
in Eq. (16b) we see it is sufficient that
4(d− 1)
3d
γ20 ≤ ε− log
2dε
d− 1 − log 6 or γ
2 ≤ 6ε− 6 log 6− 3 log
2dε
d−1
4(d− 1) .
With this choice of γ, we obtain γ+ + γ− ≥ c
√
d
ε for a numerical constant c.
2. For d ≥ ε ≥ 5, it is evident that (for some numerical constant c) the choice γ = c√ε/d satisfies
inequality (16b). Thus γ+ + γ− ≥ c
√
d
ε .
3. Finally, we consider the last case that ε ≤ 5. In this case, the choice γ2 = pi(eε−1)2/(2d(eε+1)2)
satisfies inequality (16a). We need to control the difference γ+ + γ− = E[U1 | U1 ≥ γ] + E[U1 |
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U1 ≤ γ]. In this case, let p+ = P(〈U, u〉 ≥ γ) and p− = P(〈U, u〉 < γ), so that Lemma D.3
implies that p+ ≤ 12 − e−2γ
√
d−1
2pi and p− ≥ 12 + γ
√
d−1
2pi . Then
E[U1 | U1 ≥ γ] + E[U1 | U1 < γ] = 1
p+
E[U1 · 1 {U1 ≥ γ}] + 1
p−
E[U1 · 1 {U1 < γ}]
=
(
1
p+
− 1
p−
)
E[U1 · 1 {U1 ≥ γ}] ≥
(
1− p+
p−
)
E[U1 | U1 ≥ 0],
where the second equality follows from the fact that E[U1] = 0. Using that E[U1 | U1 ≥ 0] ≥
cd−1/2 for a numerical constant c and
1− p+
p−
≥
4e−2
√
2(d−1)
pi
1 + 2e−2γ
√
2(d−1)
pi
= Ω
(
eε − 1
eε + 1
)
by our choice of γ, we obtain γ+ + γ− & (eε − 1)
√
d.
Combining the three cases above, we use that V in Alg. 1 has norm ‖V ‖2 = 1 and
‖Z‖2 ≤
2
γ+ + γ−
‖V ‖2 ≤ c
√
d ·max {ε−1, ε−2}
to obtain the first result of the proposition.
The final result of the proposition is immediate by the bound on ‖Z‖2.
C.3 Proof of Lemma 4.2
Without loss of generality, assume that u ∈ {−1, 1}d, as it is clear that E[Û | u] = u in Algorithm 2.
We now show that given u, E[V | u = u] = m · u. Consider U ∼ Uni({−1,+1}d), in which case
E[V | u = u] = pE[U | 〈U, u〉 > κ] + (1− p)E[U | 〈U, u〉 ≤ κ].
For constants κ+, κ−, uniformity of U implies that
E[U | 〈U, u〉 > κ] = κ+ · u and E[U | 〈U, u〉 ≤ κ] = κ− · u.
By symmetry it is no loss of generality to assume that u = (1, 1, · · · , 1), so 〈U, u〉 = ∑d`=1 U`. We
then have for τ = dd+κ+12 e/d that
E[U1 | 〈U, u〉 > κ] = 1
2d · P(〈U, u〉 > κ) ·
d∑
`=dτ
((
d− 1
`− 1
)
−
(
d− 1
`
))
=
(
d−1
dτ−1
)∑d
`=dτ
(
d
`
) =: κ+
and
E[U1 | 〈U, u〉 ≤ κ] = 1
2d · P(〈U, u〉 ≤ κ) ·
dτ−1∑
`=0
((
d− 1
`− 1
)
−
(
d− 1
`
))
=
−( d−1dτ−1)∑dτ−1
`=0
(
d
`
) =: κ−.
Putting these together and setting m = pκ+ + (1− p)κ−, we have E[(1/m)V | u] = u.
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C.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Using the notation of the proof of Lemma 4.2, the debiasing multiplierm satisfies 1/m = 1pκ++(1−p)κ− ≤
2
κ++κ− , as p ≥ 12 . Thus, we seek to lower bound κ+ +κ− by lower bounding κ+ and κ− individually.
We consider two cases: the case that ε ≥ log d and the case that ε < log d.
Case 1: when ε ≥ log d. We first focus on lower bounding
κ+ =
(
d−1
dτ−1
)∑d
`=dτ
(
d
`
) = τ · ( ddτ)∑d
`=dτ
(
d
`
) = τ ·( d∑
`=dτ
(
d
dτ
)−1(d
`
))−1
.
We argue that eventually the terms in the summation become small. For ` ≥ dτ defining
r :=
dτ + 1
d− dτ ≤
`+ 1
d− ` =
(
d
`
)(
d
`+1
) implies (d
`
)
≥ r
(
d
`+ 1
)
,
We then have
d∑
`=dτ
(
d
dτ
)−1(d
`
)
=
d−dτ∑
i=0
(
d
dτ
)−1( d
dτ + i
)
≤
d−dτ∑
i=0
(
d
dτ
)−1( d
dτ
)(
1
r
)i
=
d−dτ∑
i=0
1
ri
≤ 1
1− 1/r ,
so that
κ+ ≥ 1− 1/r = 1− d− dτ
dτ + 1
=
2dτ − d+ 1
dτ + 1
=
{
2 · κ+2d+κ+3 for odd d+ κ
2 · κ+3d+κ+4 for even d+ κ
≥ κ
d
. (29)
We now lower bound κ−, where we use the fact that dτ−1 ≥ d−12 for κ ∈ {0, 1, · · · , d} to obtain
κ− =
−( d−1dτ−1)∑τ ·d−1
`=0
(
d
`
) = −τ ( ddτ)∑dτ−1
`=0
(
d
`
) ≥ −τ ( ddτ)
2d−1
.
Using Stirling’s approximation and that τ = dd+κ+12 e/d, we have(
d
dτ
)
= C(κ, d)
√
1
d
· 2d · exp
(
−κ
2
2d
)
,
where C(κ, d) is upper and lower bounded by positive universal constants. Hence, we have for a
constant c <∞,
κ− ≥ −c ·
(
1√
d
· exp
(−κ2
2d
))
. (30)
An inspection of the bound (21) shows that the choice κ = c
√
εd for some (sufficiently small)
constant c immediately satisfies the sufficient condition for Algorithm 2 to be private. Substituting
this choice of κ into the lower bounds (29) and (30) gives that the normalizerm−1 ≤ 2κ++κ− .
√
d/ε,
which is first result of Proposition 5.
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Case 2: when ε < log d. In this case, we use the bound (20) to obtain the result. Let us first
choose κ to saturate the bound (20), for which it suffices to choose κ = cmin{√d, ε√d} for a
numerical constant c > 0. We assume for simplicity that d is even, as extending the argument is
simply notational. Defining the shorthand sτ :=
1
2d−1
∑dτ−1
`=d/2
(
d
`
)
, we recall the definitions of κ+
and κ− to find
κ+ = τ ·
(
d
dτ
)
· 1
1− sτ and κ− = τ ·
(
d
dτ
)
· 1
1 + sτ
.
Using the definition of the debiasing normalizer m = pκ+ + (1− p)κ− ≥ 12(κ+ + κ−), we obtain
m ≥ τ
2d
(
d
dτ
)(
1
1− sτ −
1
1 + sτ
)
=
τ
2d
(
d
dτ
)
2sτ
1− s2τ
.
By definition of sτ , we have sτ ≥ dτ−d/22d−1
(
d
dτ
) ≥ κ
2d
(
d
dτ
)
, so that
m & τκ
(
2−d
(
d
dτ
))2
& 1
d
κ exp
(
−κ
2
d
)
,
where the second inequality uses Stirling’s approximation. Our choice of κ = cmin{√d, ε√d} thus
yields m & 1√
d
min{1, ε}, which gives the second result of Proposition 5.
D Uniform random variables and concentration
In this section, we collect a number of results on the concentration properties of variables uniform
on the unit sphere Sd−1, which allow our analysis of the mechanism PrivUnit2 for privatizing
vectors in the `2 ball in Algorithm 1. For a vector u ∈ Sd−1, that is, satisfying ‖u‖2 = 1, and
a ∈ [0, 1] we define the spherical cap
C(a, u) :=
{
v ∈ Sd−1 | 〈v, u〉 > a
}
.
There are a number of bounds on the probability that U ∈ C(a, u) for a fixed u ∈ Sd−1 where
U ∼ Uni(Sd−1), which the following lemma summarizes.
Lemma D.1. Let U be uniform on the unit sphere Sd−1 in Rd. Then for
√
2/d ≤ a ≤ 1 and
u ∈ Sd−1,
1
6a
√
d
(1− a2) d−12 ≤ P(U ∈ C(a, u)) ≤ 1
2a
√
d
(1− a2) d−12 . (31)
For all 0 ≤ a ≤ 1, we have
(1− a)
2d
(1− a2) d−12 ≤ P(U ∈ C(a, u)) (32)
and for a ∈ [0, 1/√2],
P(U ∈ C(a, u)) ≤ (1− a2) d2 .
Proof The first result is [16, Exercise 7.9]. The lower bound of the second is due to [57, Lemma
4.1], while the third inequality follows for all a ∈ [0, 1/√2] by [8, Proof of Lemma 2.2].
We also require a slightly different lemma for small values of the threshold a in Lemma D.1.
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Lemma D.2. Let γ ≥ 0 and U be uniform on Sd−1. Then
γ
√
d− 1
2pi
exp
(
− 1
4d− 4 − 1
)
1
{
γ ≤
√
2/(d− 3)
}
≤ P(〈U, u〉 ∈ [0, γ]) ≤ γ
√
d− 1
2pi
Proof For any fixed unit vector u ∈ Sd−1 and U ∼ Uni(Sd−1), we have that marginally 〈U, u〉 ∼
2B − 1 for B ∼ Beta(d−12 , d−12 ). Thus we have
P(〈U, u〉 ∈ [0, γ]) = P
(
1
2
≤ B ≤ 1 + γ
2
)
We will upper and lower bound the last probability above. Letting α = d−12 for shorthand, we have
P
(
1
2
≤ B ≤ 1 + γ
2
)
=
Γ(2α)
Γ(α)2
∫ 1+γ
2
1
2
tα−1(1− t)α−1dt
(i)
=
Γ(2α)
2Γ(α)2
∫ γ
0
(
1 + u
2
)α−1(1− u
2
)α−1
du =
Γ(2α)
22α−1Γ(α)2
∫ γ
0
(1− u2)α−1du,
where equality (i) is the change of variables u = 2t − 1. Using Stirling’s approximation, we have
that
log Γ(2α)− 2 log Γ(α) = (2α− 1) log 2 + 1
2
log
α
pi
+ err(α),
where err(α) ∈ [− 18α ,− 18α+1 ]. When γ ≤
√
1/(α− 1), we have
∫ γ
0
(1− u2)α−1du ≥
∫ γ
0
1−(√ 1
α− 1
)2α−1 du ≥ γe−1
Otherwise, if γ >
√
1/(α− 1) we have the trivial bound ∫ γ0 (1 − u2)α−1du ≥ 0. Furthermore, for
γ ≥ 0 we have ∫ γ0 (1− u2)α−1du ≤ γ. Putting this all together, we have
exp
(
− 1
8α
)
·
(√
α
pi
)
· (γe−1) · 1{γ ≤ (α− 1)− 12}
≤ exp(err(α))
√
α
pi
∫ γ
0
(1− u2)α−1du = P
(
1
2
≤ B ≤ 1 + γ
2
)
≤ γ
√
α
pi
.
Substituting α 7→ d−12 yields the desired upper and lower bounds on P(〈U, u〉 ∈ [0, γ]).
As a consequence of Lemma D.2, we have the following result.
Lemma D.3. Let γ ∈ [0,√2/(d− 3)] and U be uniform on Sd−1. Then
1
2
− γ
√
d− 1
2pi
≤ P(U ∈ C(γ, u)) ≤ 1
2
− γ
√
d− 1
2pi
e−
4d−3
4d−4 .
Proof We have
P (U ∈ C(γ, u)) = 1− P (〈U, u〉 < γ) = 1/2− P (〈U, u〉 ∈ [0, γ)) .
We then use Lemma D.2
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